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Constructing a "Creative
Reading": Will US State Cannabis
Legislation Threaten the Fate of
the International Drug Control
Treaties?
ABSTRACT
While marijuana remains illegal at the federal level in the
United States, state-level efforts to legalize cannabis have gained
enormous momentum in recent years. The federal government,
which possesses only limited power to stop this trend, has
responded by grudgingly allowing such efforts to proceed,
maintaining that its inaction on the issue comports with the
international drug control regime. This presents a particularly
complex problem for international policymakers and legal
scholars, who worry that this state-federal conflict may render
international drug treaties meaningless. This Note argues that
the federal government's trategy is a productive lens through
which to view an international treaty regime that must change to
survive. If state-level cannabis experiments are too far along to
rein in and the federal government lacks the power or motivation
to stop them, the conventional wisdom is that the treaties will
diminish. This Note challenges that misconception and assesses
practical transnational dimensions of US state-level cannabis
activity, including human rights arguments and sovereignty
questions applied to the treaties governing international drug
policy. In light of the strict text of the drug control treaties and
the accelerating pace of state-level initiatives, preserving the
international drug treaties demands a "creative reading" of their
text alongside a flexible interpretive schema. This Note seeks to
articulate the benefits and limitations of such a novel reading.
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I. BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL AT THE
CROSSROADS
State-level marijuana regulations in the United States are
proliferating in great number.' At the most radical end of the
spectrum, Colorado, Washington, Massachusetts, Nevada, and
California have all adopted pseudo-legalization regimes, permitting
widespread recreational use of the drug; this means that in certain
localities within these states, marijuana is as easy to purchase as
liquor. Many other states have taken smaller steps toward legalization,
such as allowing different types of medical marijuana use,
decriminalizing small-scale possession, or designing other regulatory
regimes.2 These regulatory regimes ultimately work to fit the
respective state's needs and policy goals.3 Most recently, in November
2016, four more US states passed ballot initiatives legalizing some
form of marijuana use.4 In the eyes of federal law, of course, marijuana
1. See Avantika Chilkoti, States Keep Saying Yes to Marijuana Use. Now Comes
the Federal No., N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
07/15/us/politics/marijuana-laws-state-federal.html [https://perma.cclTU2F-FUDZ]
(archived Oct. 23, 2017) ("Around one-fifth of Americans now live in states where
marijuana is legal for adult use, according to the Brookings Institution, and an estimated
200 million live in places where medicinal marijuana is legal. Cannabis retailing has
moved from street corners to state-of-the-art dispensaries and stores . . . ."); see generally
Melanie Reid, The Quagmire That Nobody in the Federal Government Wants to Talk
About: Marijuana, 44 N.M. L. REV. 169 (2014) (discussing different potential avenues to
future marijuana regulation, including Congressional legalization, allowance of medical
marijuana, and enforcement of criminal statutes).
2. See Thomas Fuller, Californians Legalize Marijuana in Vote That Could
Echo Nationally, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/
us/politics/marijuana-legalization.html [https://perma.ce/Y4ZQ-R6TL] (archived Nov. 1,
2017).
3. See generally ROBERT A. MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY
(2017).
4. Christopher Ingraham, Marijuana Wins Big on Election Night, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/
1 1/08/medical-marijuana-sails-to-victory-in-florida/ [https://perma.cc/44TG-LW9V]
(archived Nov. 12, 2016); see also Alyson Martin, Marijuana Industry Says Trump Can't
Turn Back The Clock On Legal Pot, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 1, 2017, 3:13 PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/alysonmartin/marijuana-industry-says-trump-cant-turn-
back-the-clock-on-le?utmterm=.dt8RD3VVq#.iiY614PPg [https://perma.cclNDC3-
7PAG] (archived Mar. 2, 2017) ("While the coming months could mean status quo or
chaos for the cannabis industry, the broad approach seems to be: Until something
changes, it's business as usual."); Ethan Nadelmann, Opinion, As Trump Said in the
Campaign, Leave Pot to the States, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/opinion/as-trump-said-in-the-campaign-leave-pot-
to-the-states.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/AY9A-B7NQ] (archived Feb. 27, 2017)
("Making the transition from generations of marijuana prohibition to legal regulation of
this dynamic market was never going to be a quick and easy enterprise. The Trump
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remains grouped with heroin, peyote, and psilocybin as a Schedule I
drug under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).5 Decades after some
commentators prematurely expressed optimism that marijuana would
be legalized,6 and decades after policymakers first expressed concerns
about potential problems with criminalizing cannabis,7 legal
liberalization and regulation at the state level are proceeding at a rapid
clip.
As states begin to work out kinks in their regulatory schemes,6 the
United States will need to reevaluate its approach to international
drug control obligations. The Obama administration's strategy in this
highly fluid area of law was to allow state-level legalization efforts to
proceed within certain guidelines while maintaining that the United
States remained in compliance with its international obligations. The
Trump administration's policy has been to vocally oppose state-level
efforts, but the administration is bound by Obama-era legislative
changes;9 thus far there has been little practical change in federal
enforcement efforts in states where marijuana is now effectively legal.
The international body charged with administering drug control
treaties has remained unconvinced of the wisdom of these changes,
administration . . . can't stop it but they're clearly going to make it harder and more
treacherous.").
5. Schedule I drugs: (a) "[have] a high potential for abuse"; (b) "[have] no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States"; and (c) "[have] a lack
of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision."
Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 812 (West 2016).
6. See, e.g., Mark A. Leinwand, The International Law of Treaties and United
States Legalization of Marijuana, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 413, 413 (1971) (citations
omitted) ("As the debate on marijuana rages, the prospect must inevitably be considered
that at some time the United States may legalize the drug.").
7. EMILY CRICK ET AL., GLOBAL DRUG POLICY OBSERVATORY, LEGALLY
REGULATED CANNABIS MARKETS IN THE US: IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES 3 (2013),
https://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/Leg%20Reg%2OCannabis%20digital%20new- 1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NX57-KHE5] (archived Jan. 10, 2017) (referencing the development of
the Shafer Commission in 1972, and its recommendation that marijuana prohibition
end). Other reports were issued prior to the 1970s; the drug prohibition system has long
had its critics. See DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL: CONSENSUS
FRACTURED 158 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Michael Roberts, Scott Pack Indicted in Colorado Pot Biz's Largest
Fraud Case Ever, Attorney Says, WESTWORD (June 14, 2017, 5:50 AM),
http://www.westword.com/news/scott-pack-indicted-in-huge-colorado-marijuana-fraud-
case-9156890 [https://perma.cc/B7VB-96JT] (archived Oct. 23, 2017); Third Death in
Colorado Linked to Marijuana Edibles, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 27, 2015),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/03/third-death-in-colorado-linked-to-edible-
marijuana/#.WfkFmiPI2w [https://perma.cclP7DD-LQ3D] (archived Nov. 6, 2016).
9. See United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016).
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expressing alarm at the prospect of state-level legalization.1 0 The
Supreme Court has thus far declined to intervene.11
This Note addresses several transnational dimensions of state-
level marijuana law liberalization, arguing that the federal
government's exercise of prosecutorial discretion with regard to state-
level liberalization efforts is a legitimate reinterpretation of
international drug control treaty requirements. Though state-level
liberalization threatens the integrity of the international drug control
regime, the US federal government lacks the power to fully stop it. As
a result, interpretive flexibility is necessary-it represents the best
way to preserve the treaties at issue.
To defend this position, this Note argues that the federal
government should incorporate two previously unlinked academic and
policy critiques of the drug treaties into its contention that
circumstances have changed sufficiently to allow a new approach.
These two arguments are: (1) a human rights outlook, which focuses
on the social impact of drug control policy on vulnerable communities,
and (2) a sovereignty outlook, which argues for federalist
interpretations of the drug treaties. A human rights perspective
focuses on the social impact that drug control policies have had on
vulnerable communities, and a sovereignty argument focuses on
potential textual outlets in the drug treaties for federalist
interpretations. The assertion of this joint argument will allow the
treaties to continue to perform functions desirable at the international
level (for example, international cooperation on heroin trafficking)
while preventing over-criminalization of lower-impact activity (like
personal consumption of cannabis) from threatening the treaties'
moral stature and textual cohesiveness. This strategy would also
broaden the conversation on drug control, creating space for federalist
nations to experiment internally with drug control.
10. See Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Role of States in Shaping the Legal Debate
on Medical Marijuana, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 697, 714-15 (2016).
11. See Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (denying leave to file a
complaint in case initiated to challenge Colorado's marijuana regulatory structure);
Christopher Ingraham, What today's Supreme Court decision means for the future of
legal weed, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2016/03/2 1/what-todays-supreme-court-decision-means-for-the-future-
of-legal-weed/ [https://perma.cc/RZP8-KGER] (archived Oct. 16, 2016) ("Oklahoma and
Nebraska asked the Supreme Court to hear a challenge to Colorado's marijuana
legalization framework, saying that the state's legalization regime was causing
marijuana to flow across the borders into their own states . . . But by a 6-2 majority, the
Supreme Court declined to hear the case, without comment."); see also McIntosh, 833
F.3d at 1163 (holding that a Congressional rider prevented the Department of Justice
from spending money on enforcement of marijuana laws against patients complying with
state medical marijuana laws).
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The law in this area is fragmented and fluid, as different
jurisdictions both nationally and internationally revisit the legal
status of marijuana.12 New US state ballot referendums regarding
cannabis appear each election cycle, and foreign jurisdictions like
Uruguay, Bolivia, Canada, and Portugal are years into their respective
experiments with drug legalization.1 3 The Netherlands' famously
tolerant drug policy remains unchanged, despite a recent attempt to
roll it back.14 On the commercial side in the United States, tobacco
companies and other corporate actors eagerly anticipate legal
cannabis's entry into a competitive and lucrative national market.1 5
12. A client posing a question to her attorney ("What will happen to me if I'm
caught using marijuana?") will be disappointed to hear that oft-repeated phrase ("It's
complicated."). Indeed, factors influencing the lawyer's answer might well include the
state in which the conversation takes place, the client's medical marijuana licensing
status, who in fact is doing the "catching" (federal agents versus tate officials), how
much discretion officers of that state possess, the amount of marijuana in question, and
the proximity of consumption to areas like school zones. Although this Note addresses
international and transnational issues arising from legalization, the client context is
crucial.
13. See BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 192-93. Generally, Bewley-Taylor
posits, national and local departures from prohibitionist cannabis regimes hare the
following characteristics: a realization that "zero-tolerance" policies have not impacted
the black market, an admission that the criminal justice system is ill-equipped to deal
with addiction, and an attraction to "resource savings." Id. at 191; see also Ian Austen,
Trudeau Unveils Bill Legalizing Recreational Marijuana in Canada, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/canada/trudeau-marijuana.html?
smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share [https://perma.c/2GDH-ARWR]
(archived Oct. 23, 2017); Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, How to Win a War on Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/opinion/sunday/portugal-
drug-decriminalization.html? r=O [https://perma.cc/9XWN-9VL4] (archived Oct. 23,
2017) ("I've been apprehensive of decriminalizing hard drugs for fear of increasing
addiction. Portugal changed my mind, and its policy seems fundamentally humane and
lifesaving. Yet let's also be realistic about what is possible: Portugal's approach works
better than America's, but nothing succeeds as well as we might hope."); Ernesto
Londofio, Uruguay's Marijuana Law Turns Pharmacists Into Dealers, N.Y. TIMES (July
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/world/americas/uruguay-legalizes-pot-
marijuana.html?mcubz=l [https://perma.cc/33E2-ABTN] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
14. See, e.g., David Jolly, Amsterdam Shops Selling Marijuana to Stay Open,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/worldleurope/
amsterdam-mayor-says-cannabis-coffee-shops-will-remain-open.html [https://perma.cc/
JKT8-9PBC] (archived Feb. 18, 2017) ("Amsterdam's 220 coffee shops,
where marijuana and hashish are openly sold and consumed, will remain open next year
in spite of a new Dutch law meant to reduce drug tourism, the city's mayor said in an
interview. . . .").
15. See, e.g., Tara Lachappelle & Rani Molla, Tobacco's Big Pot of Gold,
BLOOMBERG GADFLY (Apr. 20, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/
articles/2016-04-20/marijuana-could-be-big-tobacco-s-next-pot-of-gold [https://perma.cc/
ACW7-EFED] (archived Oct. 16, 2016).
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In the United States, marijuana liberalization has not increased
usage rates or increased the rates of car accidents.'6 At the same time,
racial disparities in arrest statistics for marijuana offenses remain
static, even in US states that have decriminalized marijuana
possession.'7 Meanwhile, the international treaties governing
marijuana control are decades old.' 8 These issues raise the inevitable
question: are international norms regarding marijuana taking a back
seat to sub-national innovations? International norms are an
important factor in the US federal government's approach to
legalization, and absent a major shift in federal priorities, marijuana
policy will remain purgatorial, as innovation in legalization states
accelerates.
There are few historical analogies to the statutory no man's land
in which a potential consumer of marijuana now finds him or herself.
The illegal user, recreational user, registered patient, or unregistered
patient's rights shift markedly across US state boundaries. A federal
prohibition on the use or possession of cannabis currently stands
alongside many states' embrace of tax revenues derived from the sale
16. See Jayson D. Aydelotte et al., Crash Fatality Rates After Recreational
Marijuana Legalization in Washington and Colorado, 107 AM. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH
1329, 1329-31 (2017) ("Three years after recreational marijuana legalization, changes
in motor vehicle crash fatality rates for Washington and Colorado were not statistically
different from those in similar states without recreational marijuana legalization.");
William C. Kerr et al., Trends and age, period and cohort effects for marijuana use
prevalence in the 1984 to 2015 US National Alcohol Surveys, ADDICTION (Oct. 11, 2017),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/add.14031/full [https://perma.cclD972-DRLN]
(archived Oct. 23, 2017) (subscription required) ("The steep rise in marijuana use in the
United States since 2005 occurred across the population and is attributable to general
period effects not linked specifically to the liberalization of marijuana policies in some
states.").
17. See Spencer Buell, ACLU Report Finds Discrimination in Massachusetts'
Marijuana Arrests, BOSTON MAG.: DAILY (Oct. 6, 2016, 12:20 PM),
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2016/10/06/aclu-massachusetts-marijuanal
[https://perma.cclNBF4-BEWV] (archived Oct. 16, 2016); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION OF MASS., THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK & WHITE: A MASSACHUSETTS
UPDATE 6 (2016), https://aclum.org/app/uploads/2016/10/TR-Report-10-2016-FINAL-
with-cover.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UQ6-2PTG] (archived Oct. 16, 2016) ("Black people
continue to be arrested at higher rates for marijuana offenses than white people, despite
the fact that white people use and sell at similar rates. Disparity between Black and
white arrest rates also increased during several years since decriminalization.");
BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 196-97 (discussing marijuana arrests as allowing
officers to hit arrest quotas because marijuana use is easy to discover and prosecute); see
generally MIKOS, supra note 3, at 521-25.
18. TRANSNATIONAL INST., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DRUG POLICY REFORM:
REPORT OF A GDPO/ICHRDP/TNI/WOLA EXPERT SEMINAR 34-35 (2015),
https://www.tni.org/en/publicationlinternational-law-and-drug-policy-reform
[https://perma.cclK9SA-B278] (archived Jan. 7, 2017) [hereinafter GDPO EXPERT
SEMINAR REPORT] (calling the international drug control system "Jurassic").
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of cannabis, in addition to states' elimination of formerly strict
prohibitions on personal consumption of the drug. States arguably are
sanctioning and profiting from a statutorily impermissible activity at
the federal level.
One might analogize to local opposition to Prohibition during the
early part of the twentieth century, but no state government ignored
the directive of the Eighteenth Amendment and collected taxes on
public liquor sales. From an individual rights perspective, we might
analogize to gay marriage before Windsor,'" but the Defense of
Marriage Act simply prevented the federal government from
recognizing same-sex marriage.2 0 As this dissonance between state and
federal government approaches to marijuana continues to grow more
pronounced, the federal government's position on a potential resolution
(rescheduling marijuana, or perhaps continuing the policies
articulated by former Attorney General Holder, discussed below) must
crucially incorporate a plan to contend with the international
obligations to which the United States has acceded. This is an
uncommon problem, and untangling it will take years.
Parts L.A and I.B of this Note survey the international drug
control treaties, their text, and their effects. Part I.C discusses US
federal law as it relates to marijuana enforcement in the states. Part
II addresses the complexities of enforcing the international drug treaty
regime. Part III articulates a human rights argument for the easing of
the drug control treaties with regard to cannabis, and Part IV speaks
to the complexities of nation-state sovereignty over treaty enforcement.
American society is experiencing a ddja vu moment - just as in 1933,
the costs of Prohibition are becoming apparent, and a new system is
emerging through a tangled and inexact democratic process.21
19. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
20. Id. at 2694 ("Under DOMA, same-sex married couples have their lives
burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible and public ways. By its great reach,
DOMA touches many aspects of married and family life, from the mundane to the
profound.").
21. See Stanley Neustader, Legalization Legislation: Confronting the Details of
Policy Choices, in How To LEGALIZE DRUGS 400-01 (Jefferson M. Fish ed., 1998)
(discussing non-governmental efforts at the end of Prohibition to create statutory
blueprints for alcohol regulation); see also generally Conor Friesdorf, How Drug
Prohibition Fuels American Carnage, ATLANTIC (June 21, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.compolitics/archive/2017/06/drug-prohibition-fuels-violent-
crime-on-americas-streets/530895/ [https://perma.cclD4Z7-E2P4] (archived on Oct. 23,
2017).
In this Note, I refer to "drug prohibition" as such, while I employ the term "Prohibition"
to refer to the program carried out by the United States concerning alcohol under the
Eighteenth Amendment between 1920 and 1933.
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Prohibition itself can serve as a rough analog for a transition of drug
policy from a prohibitionist approach to a regulatory approach.22
A. The International Drug Control Treaty Regime
The United States is party to three major international drug
control treaties: (1) the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961,
amended by the 1972 Protocol; (2) the 1972 Protocol, which amended
the Single Convention of 1961 to comport with the Convention of
Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and (3) the United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances of 1988.23 Other commentators have conducted more in-
depth surveys and analyses of these treaties.24
Several crucial points should guide any analysis of these
instruments. First, although marijuana produces similar physiological
effects to alcohol, none of the conventions prohibits or regulates
alcohol. If the United States were to adopt an alcohol-minded approach
to marijuana (tax, regulate, and reduce harm with programs geared to
alleviating alcoholism), the treaties could lose a major raison d'itre
behind their adoption.2 5 This omission casts doubt on the Conventions'
feigned concern with public health. Relatedly, the Conventions
themselves are not based on the science and principles of harm
reduction.26
Second, the international regime on drug control was "developed
on the premise that a reduction in the illicit drug markets will be
22. See Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, The Transition from Prohibition to
Regulation: Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, in How To LEGALIZE DRUGS,
supra note 21, at 282. Levine and Reinarman write:
Punitive drug prohibition can therefore be distinguished from more
tolerant and humane forms of drug prohibition - from what we call
regulatory drug prohibition. Though still prohibitionist, regulatory
prohibition does not rely so heavily on arresting and imprisoning
men and women for possessing and using illicit drugs or for small-
scale dealing.
Id. (emphasis in original).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 39, 49, and 54.
24. See, e.g., Daniel Heilmann, The International Control of Illegal Drugs and
the U.N. Treaty Regime: Preventing or Causing Human Rights Violations?, 19 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237, 239-53 (2011).
25. See id. at 240; see also Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization & International
Narcotics Trafficking, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 89, 96-97 (1999) ("U.S. efforts to
promote international cooperation on alcohol consumption proved less effective. While
some countries joined in prohibiting alcohol, these efforts were limited and few."); see
generally Robin Room, Legalizing a Market for Cannabis for Pleasure: Colorado,
Washington, Uruguay and beyond, 109 ADDICTION 345, 345-51 (2013).
26. See BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 287.
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achieved predominantly through prohibition-oriented .[supply-side]
measures."2 7 Thus, the treaties were founded on the assumption that
their adoption would decrease consumption. The assumption was that
the treaties would be successful.2 8 It is well settled that the treaties
have effectively failed.2 9
Because the premises underlying these treaties were faulty, the
international drug control system has not achieved what the treaties
were designed to do. Although this Note only addresses cannabis
issues, these points apply with equal force to other narcotics. The
United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime itself recognized the
"unintended consequences" of international drug control, including:
the development of the black market for illicit drugs, a policy
displacement between law enforcement and public health, a
geographical displacement of production, a substance displacement,
and the marginalization of drug users.3 0 The failure of the treaties has
27. Heilmann, supra note 24, at 240 (citing BECKLEY FOUND. DRUG POLICY
PROGRAMME, RECALIBRATING THE REGIME: THE NEED FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DRUG POLICY 20 (2008)),
https://www.hri.global/files/2010/06/16/BarrettRecalibratingTheRegime.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FV44-UE4M] (archived Oct. 17, 2016) [hereinafter RECALIBRATING THE
REGIME]). The "supply side" language appears in the original report that Heilmann cites.
See also David R. Bewley-Taylor, Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems
and possibilities, 14 INT'L J. OF DRUG POL'Y 171, 172 (2003) [hereinafter Challenging the
UNJ ("The prohibitionist character of the Convention is beyond doubt.").
28. For example, the Single Convention of 1961's goal was to eliminate opium
within 15 years, and marijuana within 25 years. See Biju Panicker, Note, Legalization
ofMarijuana and the Conflict with International Drug Control Treaties, 16 CHI.-KENT J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 6-7 (2016) (citing Martin Jelsma, The Development of International
Drug Control: Lessons Learned and Strategic Challenges for the Future 4 (Jan. 24,
2011), http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/themes/gedp-v1/pdf/
GlobalComMartinJelsma.pdf [https://perma.ccfUS8V-6MDE] (archived Oct. 17,
2016)).
29. Raustiala, supra note 25, at 113 ('The effectiveness of the international legal
regime for drug control is generally considered low in relation to the scope of the
problem."); see also BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 291; CRICK, supra note 7, at 20
(calling the international drug control system "increasingly creaky"); Damon Barrett &
Manfred Novak, The United Nations and Drug Policy: Towards a Human Rights Based
Approach, in THE DIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR
KALLIOPI K. KOUFA 449 (Aristotle Constantinides & Nikos Zaikos eds., 2009) ("[T]he
United Nations drug control system is seen as a significant part of the drug problem,
rather than part of the solution."); Aart Hendriks & Katarina Tomasevski, Human
Rights and Drug Use, in DRUG USE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: REPORT FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 53 (Jos Silvis et al. eds., 1992); GDPO EXPERT SEMINAR REPORT,
supra note 18, at 22 ("[F]rom an internal perspective, the UN Conventions are obsolete
since drug consumption is a given in all parts of the world.").
30. Heilmann, supra note 24, at 267-69 (discussing U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm. on Narcotic Drugs, Making Drug Control "Fit for Purpose": Building on the




played out with devastating consequences in the world's most
vulnerable communities. Since the early twentieth century, drug
prohibition has served as the instrument of society's baser elements,
racial animus and xenophobia.3 1 Philosophy scholars have asserted
these arguments for decades.3 2 As Barrett and Novak have noted,
"[t]here is a danger that drug control has become an end in itself."33
Third, the international drug control treaties might be better
conceptualized as a fundamental misallocation of resources amongst
demand-side, supply-side, and harm reduction solutions.34 A
hypothetical drug control strategy could focus primarily on drug
consumers (some might deem them addicts, while others might deem
them patients), on suppliers and producers of drugs, or on reducing
general harm to society. A demand-side strategy might include drug
abuse treatment; a supply-side strategy might include crop
destruction; and a harm reduction strategy might include state-
sponsored needle exchanges.35 The recent moves of US states to reduce
criminal justice involvement in policing marijuana use are better
understood as a state-sponsored transition to a harm reduction
model.36 While legalizing and taxing marijuana may not fit the
definition of a drug control strategy as contemplated by the
E-CN7-2008-CRP17_E.pdf [https://perma.cclEUR9-L7FK] (archived Oct. 17, 2016)); see
also Shu-Acquaye, supra note 10, at 730-31 (referencing the social costs of drug
prohibition); Melissa T. Aoyagi, Note, Beyond Punitive Prohibition: Liberalizing the
Dialogue on International Drug Policy, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 555, 564-67 (2005)
(referencing the "deleterious effects" of the U.S. commitment to waging the drug war).
31. Raustiala, supra note 25, at 96 ("Opium, marijuana, and cocaine use was also
associated with ethnic and racial minorities in the United States, in particular with
those of Chinese, Latin American, or African descent, and hence drug prohibition efforts
were fed by xenophobia, racism, and anti-immigrant sentiments."); see also Barrett &
Novak, supra note 29, at 451 (discussing the increase in prison populations and racial
disparities in enforcement of drug laws in the United States).
32. See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, & THE LAW: AN ESSAY
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION 179 (1982) (referencing drug use's
cultural connotations of the cultural "other," and opining, "It is difficult to see anything
in these claims but familiar sociological manifestations of cultural hegemony.").
33. Barrett & Novak, supra note 29, at 458.
34. Raustiala, supra note 25, at 99-100 (noting that supply-side efforts are less
effective and more expensive than demand-side and harm reduction strategies); see also
BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 294 (discussing a "policy displacement" between health
and law enforcement).
35. Raustiala, supra note 25, at 99-100.
36. This shift would constitute a marked change from the "supply-side focus,
criminal justice implementation, and moralizing impulse" characterizing prior U.S. drug
control efforts. Id. at 137; see also RECALIBRATING THE REGIME, supra note 27, at 11
(discussing the "moralistic perspective" of the drug control regime).
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international drug control treaties as originally written,3 7 marijuana
remains a widely produced crop and is still used in countless
jurisdictions by millions of users.3 8 Nothing in the treaties has changed
these basic facts, and popular state-level movements to lessen
penalties for cannabis use lay bare the contradictions inherent in the
drug treaties' normative structure.
B. The Single Convention, the 1972 Protocol, and the 1988 Convention
With those structural infirmities in mind, it is necessary to
consider the text of the treaties themselves. The 1961 Single
Convention, in the main, created a scheduling system for controlled
substances, organized information-gathering protocols for member
states, and authorized a treaty body, the International Narcotics
Control Board (INCB), to investigate implementation issues.3 9 Under
the Single Convention, the INCB has the power to recommend trade
sanctions for treaty violators but has rarely done so.40 The INCB
37. See Challengng the UN, supra note 27, at 173 ("The centrality of the principle
of limiting narcotic and psychotropic drugs for medical and scientific purposes leaves no
room for the legal possibility of recreational use.").
38. See, e.g., Kurt Snibbe, California's marijuana production is already mind
boggling, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Dec. 29, 2016, 2:26 PM),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/infographic-739746-marijuana-california.html
[https://perma.cc/2SQ4-V6C6] (archived Feb. 18, 2017).
39. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 art. 1, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T.
1407, 976 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Single Convention] (defining "schedule"); id. art. 18
(information gathering); id. art. 9-15, 20 (INCB); see also Raustiala, supra note 25, at
106-07.
40. Raustiala, supra note 25, at 107 (citing INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD.,
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL TREATIES, at 20, U.N. Doc.
E/INCB/1994/1/Supp.1, U.N. Sales No. E.95.XI.5 (1995), https://www.incb.org/
documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR1994/E-INCB-1994-1-Supp-1-e.pdf
[https://perma.cclDB4S-8QUY] (archived Oct. 19, 2016) ("[T]he Board has often
requested certain Governments to provide explanations or to take remedial measures . .
. . The Board has, until now, never made use of the final steps foreseen in article 14 of
the 1961 Convention and article 19 of the 1971 Convention.")); see also WELLS BENNETT
& JOHN WALSH, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. AT BROOKINGS, MARIJUANA
LEGALIZATION IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MODERNIZE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TREATIES 13
(2014), https://www.brookings.eduwp-content/uploads/2016/06/CEPMMJ
Legalizationv4.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FYG-UJUFJ (archived Feb. 18, 2017) ("[T]he
Board has not, for example, paired its objections with a threat to exercise its rather
gentle, purely recommendatory and rarely invoked sanctions power, regarding the
import and export of drugs."); Challenging the UN, supra note 27, at 173 ("Indeed, while
often vocal in its criticism of national policy, the INCB, as the body responsible for
overseeing the operation of the treaties, has no formal power to enforce the
implementation of the Convention provisions. Nor has the Board the formal power to
punish parties for non-compliance."); GDPO EXPERT SEMINAR REPORT, supra note 18, at
25 (calling the INCB "a dog that can't bite"); see generally DAMON BARRETT, INT'L HARM
REDUCTION ASS'N, 'UNIQUE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS'? A COMPARISON OF THE
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continues to release frequent reports on drug policy.4 1 The Single
Convention also specifies that the World Health Organization (WHO)
must assess the danger of problematic substances,42 and all treaty
members must criminalize all quantities of possession of drugs
designated as dangerous.4 3 The Single Convention "entailed far more
regulatory power than any previous international drug accord,"44 and
its primary approach was "prohibitionist."4 5 Notably, the Netherlands,
a Convention signatory, does not prosecute the use of marijuana; this
longstanding practice exemplifies the toothless nature of the Board's
disapproval.4 6 Commentators have suggested that this particular
treaty could accommodate a more flexible interpretation of drug use.47
An early commentator even suggested that the treaty's provisions
could be separable.4 8
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD AND THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
BODIES 5 (2008), https://www.hri.global/files/2010/06/16/Barrett-
UniqueinInternationalRelations.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4VH-VW2E] (archived Jan. 7,
2017) [hereinafter UNIQUE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] (arguing that the INCB's
practices are anti-democratic and closed door, an outlier in the international system).
41. Aoyagi, supra note 30, at 583-85 nn.113-116 (discussing the INCB's
criticism of, amongst other things, Dutch coffee shops, personal use of marijuana, and
certain types of heroin addiction programs). Aoyagi's excellent assemblage and
discussion of the INCB Reports is important for a simple reason: the INCB issues reports
disdaining practices and does nothing more. These reports have even contained
proposals criminalizing free speech. See Ted Galen Carpenter, Collateral Damage: The
Wide-Ranging Consequences of America's Drug War, in AFTER PROHIBITION: AN ADULT
APPROACH TO DRUG POLICIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 157 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2000).
42. Single Convention, supra note 39, art. 3 (noting that the WHO's
recommendation then passes to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs ("CND"), which can
then adopt the recommendation).
43. For a more thorough exploration of the treaty's finer points, see Panicker,
supra note 28, at 7-8. See also Aoyagi, supra note 30, at 577-81. Consider too the radical
nature of this requirement: as Prohibition proved, criminalizing an activity as
widespread as personal drug use puts police in the uneviable position of preventing an
activity that individuals may puruse entirely inside their homes.
44. Raustiala, supra note 25, at 107.
45. Heilmann, supra note 24, at 244-45.
46. Shu-Acquaye, supra note 10, at 715; see also Aoyagi, supra note 30, at 583-
85 nn.113-116.
47. See, e.g., Heilmann, supra note 24, at 279 ("Understood correctly, the
international drug control regime is not hostile towards a somewhat liberal approach
that emphasizes education, treatment, and even harm reduction over purely repressive
measures."); Aoyagi, supra note 30, at 586 ("The foregoing justifications [of the INCB]
constitute the prism though which advocates of punitive prohibition view the treaties. A
straightforward analysis of the text of the treaty, however, yields a different, more
flexible interpretation of the treaty's provisions on personal drug use.").
48. See Leinwand, supra note 6, at 430. Leinwand additionally posited that the
inclusion of marijuana in the 1961 Convention was a mistake:
Cannabis thus does not belong - and, objectively, never did belong -
in the provisions of a treaty whose stated purpose is to prevent
'addition to narcotic drugs.' The inclusion of cannabis in a narcotics
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The 1972 Protocol updated the Single Convention in accordance
with the goals and policy provisions adopted at the separate 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.49 "[Clompared with the strict
controls imposed on plant-based drugs under the Single Convention,
the 1971 Convention imposes a somewhat weaker control
mechanism."5 0 A major focus of the 1972 Protocol is crop destruction.5 1
The 1972 Protocol also contains a trade measures provision, which, like
the punitive measures specified for noncompliant signatories of the
Single Convention, has seldom been used.5 2 One important difference
is that the 1971 Convention, which prompted the adoption of the 1972
Protocol, used public health language to discuss the problem of drug
control.5 3
The 1988 Convention5 4 expanded the scope of enforcement to
further criminalize supply-side activities like production, sale, and
transport of both precursor and narcotic substances.5 5 The 1988
Convention "is striking for its focus on internal, domestic activities and
on trade in legal drug-related commerce-such as precursors and
equipment-rather than international drug trafficking only."56 While
the United States sought trafficking penalties during negotiations,
"producer" countries, where drugs are manufactured or grown, argued
for the inclusion of personal consumption penalties in "consumer"
states like the United States.57 A focus on the "market chain" of
substance abuse and the further criminalization of activities along the
chain predating consumption is a crucial underpinning of the 1988
Convention.5 8
treaty was a mistake, based on the erroneous scientific and medical
information generally available to the delegates when the treaty was
drafted.
Id. at 431 (citations absent in original); see also BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 284-
86 (discussing Leinwand).
49. Protocol of 1972 Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,
Mar. 25, 1972, U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1972 Protocol]; Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter
Psychotropic Convention].
50. Heilmann, supra note 24, at 247.
51. Id. at 246.
52. Raustiala, supra note 25, at 108-109 n.95.
53. Aoyagi, supra note 30, at 579.
54. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, 28 I.L.M. 497 [hereinafter 1988
Convention].
55. Raustiala, supra note 25, at 108.
56. Id. at 109-110.
57. Aoyagi, supra note 30, at 580.
58. Panicker, supra note 28, at 11.
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In general, as other commentators have noted above, these
treaties do not contain many enforcement procedures outside of the
issuance of referrals and reports.59 From an effectiveness perspective,
as of 1999, illegal drugs still constituted almost 10 percent of world
trade, exceeding the automobile market.6 0 Further, the treaties
themselves comprise a skeletal legal architecture above a much wider
range of international drug suppression efforts sponsored by the
United States.6 1 These supply-side campaigns have largely failed.62
Therefore, laboratories of experimentation for marijuana reform are
desirable, even necessary, in the twenty-first century.63
C. US Federal Law Applied to Cannabis
While US federal law remains unchanged, US federal enforcement
has shifted markedly. The current fragmented state of the law in this
area is compounded by the fact that the agencies tasked with enforcing
59. See Aoyagi, supra note 30, at 583-85 nn.113-116; Aparna Bushan, Note, An
Evaluation of the Effects of the Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado and Washington
from an International Law Perspective, 39 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 187, 199-200 (2015) (pointing
to Article 48 of the Single Convention, supra note 39, which allows for referral to the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ'), but noting that all ICJ decisions are only
enforceable with the assistance of the U.N. Security Council, where the U.S. has a veto);
see also Angela Hawken & Jonathan Kulick, Commentary, Treaties (Probably) Not an
Impediment o 'Legal' Cannabis in Washington and Colorado, 109 ADDICTION 355, 355-
56 (2014) ("mhe drug-treaty regime is barely enforceable: Bolivia suffered no lasting
harm from its denunciation and re-accession, despite the INCB's objections.. and
charges from abroad of hypocrisy or applying double standard have not been particularly
effective in obliging the United States to abide by some less-ambiguous treaty
obligations.").
60. See Raustiala, supra note 25, at 90. A more recent assessment stated that
"[gilobally, organized crime accounts for 1.5 percent of global gross domestic product and
is worth around $870 billion and of that, drugs account for 50 percent of international
organized crime income." Holly Ellyatt, Global drugs trade 'as strong as ever' as fight
fails, CNBC (Aug. 13, 2013, 2:30 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100957882
[https://perma.cc/S5BU-BAWS] (archived Oct. 19, 2016).
61. Ted Galen Carpenter, Ending the International Drug War, in HOw TO
LEGALIZE DRUGS, supra note 21, at 293 ("Washington has taken four approaches to
eradicating the supply of such [illegal] drugs: global agreements, regional and sub-
regional agreements, bilateral agreements with drug-producing or drug-transiting
countries, and unilateral coercive measures.").
62. See id. at 305 (citations omitted) ("The data merely confirm what many policy
experts - even those who do not favor legalization - have concluded for years: the
international supply-side campaign against drugs has produced meager results.").
63. See Robin Room & Peter Reuter, How well do international drug conventions
protect public health?, 379 THE LANCET 84, 90 (2012) (arguing that "[tihe international
drug treaties in their present form seriously constrain governments' capacities to engage
in such policy experiments [relating to harm reduction]").
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federal law are allowing state-level regulation, in clear conflict with
federal and international law, to proceed.
For instance, a marijuana producer who complies with state law
in Colorado remains in violation of federal law, which prohibits the use
and possession of marijuana. However, the existence of the federal ban
does not automatically mean that it will be enforced against all who
break it-the Attorney General is responsible for determining how
federal law will be enforced and against whom. While the Attorney
General's guidelines are only advisory, in practice they set the tone.64
Just as this Note went to press, Attorney General Sessions rescinded
these guidelines.65
64. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., for All United
States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK9L-T2VJ] (archived Nov. 7, 2016)
[hereinafter 2013 AG Guidelines]; see also Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says
DOJ Will Let Washington, Colorado Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 29, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-
marijuana-washington-colorado-doj-n_3837034.html [https://perma.cclUWV9-ABLV]
(archived Nov. 7, 2016). The muted tolerance of the Obama administration may be
difficult to reverse. See Tom Angell, Jeff Sessions Slams Marijuana Legalization (Again),
FORBES (Sept. 20, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/
2017/09/20/jeff-sessions-slams-marijuana-legalization-again/#6269f43027d1
[https://perma.cc/2354-Q8N5] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (noting Attorney General
Sessions' stance against marijuana legalization); Ashley C. Bradford & W. David
Bradford, Why Jeff Sessions is going to lose his war against cannabis, WASH. POST:
POSTEVERYTHING (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
posteverything/wp/2017/08/01/why-jeff-sessions-is-going-to-lose-his-war-against-
cannabis/ [https://perma.cc/8K42-HCZ3] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
65. The guidelines issued by the Obama administration identified eight
priorities in federal enforcement of the law: (1) preventing distribution of marijuana to
minors; (2) preventing the diversion of marijuana-based revenue to criminal enterprises;
(3) preventing the movement of marijuana from states where it is legal to states where
it is illegal; (4) preventing state-authorized marijuana ctivity from obscuring other
illegal activity; (5) preventing violence; (6) preventing drugged driving; (7) preventing
marijuana cultivation on public land; and (8) preventing marijuana possession and use
on federal property. 2013 AG Guidelines, supra note 64, at 1-2. In late 2017,
commentators considered it unlikely that much would change in this arena quickly. See
Janet Burns, Trump Extends Cannabis Protections 'Til December As Plans For Study,
States Remain Hazy, FORBES: WOMEN@FORBES (Sept. 25, 2017, 1:50 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2017/09/25/trump-budget-extends-cannabis-
protections-til-december-as-plans-for-study-states-remain-hazy/#6e9f914b47ff
[https://perma.cc/4QDN-Z33G] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) ("[Many aspects of federal and
state game-plans for the cannabis industry remain uncertain, forcing a range of
cannapreneurs to proceed unprotected while hoping for the best."). But in early 2018,
Attorney General Sessions revoked the Cole Memorandum; this move could allow federal
prosecutors greater latitude to bring charges against marijuana producers. See Charlie
Savage & Jack Healy, Trump Administration Takes Step That Could Threaten
Marijuana Legalization Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/politics/marijuana-legalization-justice-
department-prosecutions.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cclP8JC-AHU5] (archived Jan. 12,
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A separate executive agency memorandum, issued on February
14, 2014, noted that financial institutions could reasonably rely on the
accuracy of state information relating to marijuana businesses.66 In
other words, the current state of US law perpetuates a legal purgatory
signposted with unenforced federal prohibitions, complex state laws,
and revocable guidelines.
Given the widespread use of marijuana (every instance of which
technically violates federal law), the Obama-era Attorney General's
guidelines were an attempt to bridge the gap between states moving
ahead with marijuana regulation schemes and a static federal and
international regime. A later memorandum emphasized that the
documents should serve "solely as a guide to the exercise of
investigative and prosecutorial discretion," and may "not be relied
upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural."6 7 Despite this
hedge, it can hardly be argued that documents encouraging de facto
legalization on the ground do not at least straddle a line between
prosecutorial discretion and encouraging a violation of federal and
international law.68 The Attorney General-no matter who holds that
2018). In light of the Congressional rider discussed infra in note 88, federal prosecutors
may still decide that it is not worth bringing claims against industry stalwarts. See also
James Higdon, Did Jeff Sessions Just Increase the Odds Congress Will Make Marijuana
Legal?, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazinel
story/2018/01/06/jeff-sessions-marijuana-legalization-congress-216251
[https://perma.cclYT4B-84TQ] (archived Jan. 12, 2018) ("As of late Friday, POLITICO
Magazine could not find a single member of Congress who had issued a statement in
support of Sessions' actions. In the end, this is a self-inflicted pot crisis that could prove
to be a critical test of Trump's ability to maintain his base."); Alex Halperin, The
Cannabis Industry Is Well-Armed to Fight Jeff Sessions, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Jan. 05,
2018, 3:31 PM), https://slate.com/business/2018/01/the-weed-industry-is-well-armed-to-
fight-jeff-sessions-and-congress-may-help-it.html [https://perma.cc/7MP4-VG54]
(archived Jan. 12, 2018) ("By killing the Cole memo, Sessions may have accidentally
underscored that the industry no longer needs the protections the document offered.").
This move is an excellent example of the murkiness surrounding marijuana law: political
players act to the fullest extent of their political power to achieve their goals, but their
actions may not translate to any impact on the ground. If some U.S. Attorneys file claims
against marijuana producers, they will encounter a much more organized and well-
funded industry than existed not even ten years ago.
66. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2014-
COO1, BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES 3 (2014),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2014-GOO1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FY44-YKT9] (archived Nov. 7, 2016).
67. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., for All United
States Attorneys 3 (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
wdwa/legacy/2014/02/14/DAG%20Memo%20-%2OGuidance%2ORegarding%
20Marijuana%2ORelated%2OFinancial%2OCrimes%202%2014%2014%20%282%29.pdlf
[https://perma.cc/Q795-VAH6] (archived Nov. 7, 2016) [hereinafter 2014 AG Guidelines].
68. Bennett and Walsh opine:
2018] 263
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
office-is caught in a difficult poisiton between managing the
responsibility to enforce the law and accommodating congressional
tolerance for state-level experiments. The result is that marijuana has
not been de facto legalized, but it does potentially open the door to
allegations that the United States is violating international law. The
question is whether there are sufficient grounds for the Attorney
General's promulgation of the guidelines and for an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion (effectively forced by Congress's hand) as to
cannabis.
Wherever the limits of the United States' enforcement discretion
under the drug treaties might be drawn precisely, we know that such
discretion by definition cannot be an across-the-board, categorical
affair, when the issue is federal tolerance of regulated,
comprehensive marijuana markets established by state law. And
that's just it: if more states take a legalize-and-regulate approach, a
federal-level decision not to prosecute similarly situated persons
could start to look like blanket non-enforcement of implementing
legislation-something that, in our view, the drug treaties do not
contemplate.
BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 40, at 17. Bewley-Taylor takes a similar approach:
As we have seen, during the course of two significant waves of soft
defection, various regime members or sub-national jurisdictions
therein have moved in a variety of ways to mitigate the effects of
punitive prohibition on the non-medical and non-scientific use of
cannabis. Yet, any significant moves to reduce the suboptimability of
the GDPR and go beyond the softening of cannabis prohibition
remain legally problematic. Even the most creative reading of the
treaties would be unable to legitimize regulation without coming into
conflict with the current international legal framework. Moves to
regulate the market in order to monitor strength and purity, take the
lucrative business out of the hands of increasingly powerful criminal
organizations as well as allow the generation of what are currently
much needed tax revenues would be impossible without either some
form of full defection from or revision of the conventions. Moreover,
as with any shift towards a tolerant approach to the possession of
any currently prohibited substance for personal use, individual drug
users in most instances still source their drugs from the illicit
market; an uncomfortable paradox that exposes the limits of
pragmatism within the current international legal structure.
BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 299-300. But see Hawken & Kulick, supra note 59, at
356 ("Whether the Single Convention requires federal preemption is not evident from a
plain reading, and is much disputed.").
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Il. ENFORCING & ALTERING THE DRUG TREATY REGIME
A. Introduction
International policymakers have several different avenues for
changing the international drug control regime: (1) modification, (2)
amendment, (3) denunciation, or (4) disregard of controlling treaties.69
Each of these four avenues has disadvantages. For example, using
treaty procedures to modify the Single Convention and reschedule
cannabis could not permit private cultivation; that would require a
formal treaty amendment rather than a modification.7 0 Amending the
treaties could prove problematic given the number of signatories.7
B. Limitations with the Current Treaty System
There is a difference between a "soft" treaty challenge (for
example, arguing that because medical use of marijuana is undefined
in the treaties, there could be leeway for a medical marijuana
regulatory regime), and a "hard" treaty challenge (legalizing all drugs,
taxing them at the federal level, and ignoring the international
fallout).7 2 Given the United States' past efforts to "persuad[e], cajol[e],
and brib[e] other nations to wage a coordinated war against drugs," a
limited renunciation of the treaties' marijuana provisions (or a valid
re-interpretation) could better preserve US credibility in future
regulation of more dangerous drugs, like heroin, and drug trafficking.7 3
69. Challenging the UN, supra note 27, at 174-78; see also BRICE DE RUYVER ET
AL., MULTIDISCIPLINARY DRUG POLICIES AND THE UN DRUG TREATIES 44-62 (2002).
70. Challenging the UN, supra note 27, at 174.
71. Allison E. Don, Note, Lighten Up: Amending the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 23 MINN. J. INT'L L. 213, 236-37 (2014); see also GDPO EXPERT SEMINAR
REPORT, supra note 18, at 12-13, 28-30 (discussing the options of rescheduling cannabis,
amending the Conventions, allowing for a more flexible treaty interpretation and
application, ignoring the treaties, and denouncing the treaties as potential paths forward
for the international legal system); BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 40, at 23 n.45
(discussing the complexities of the amendment processes).
72. NEW YORK CITY BAR Ass'N COMM. ON DRUGS & THE LAW, THE
INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL TREATIES: How IMPORTANT ARE THEY TO US DRUG
REFORM? 5-6 (2012), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-
InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf [https://perma.cclH5Z3-C95M] (archived Nov. 7,
2016) [hereinafter NEW YORK BAR ASS'N].
73. Carpenter, supra note 41, at 292, 302; see also BENNETT & WALSH, supra
note 40, at 24 (The U.S. "has unique leverage. Exit or the credible threat of exit . .. has
brought about key changes in other multilateral treaties, including those establishing
international organizations . .. [I]t would be wrong to downplay the importance, to other
drug treaty signatories, of the United States' continued law enforcement and other drug
treaty-based cooperation worldwide."). Another under-explored option would be for the
U.S. to amend the treaty to insert an explicit federalism reservation; this is neither
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The United States supplied the "moral legitimacy" and the
economic heft to enforce these treaties.74 Ironically, the most powerful
force animating the drug control enforcement system is inertia.75
Inertia in this context means that because the political will to change
the regime has not materialized, the status quo remains in force. The
fact that the United States created the international drug control
unusual nor unprecedented. See Symdon Karagiannis, The Territorial Application of
Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 305 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2014).
Karagiannis writes:
A federal State may also seek to issue reservations or
understandings on ratification that address obligations that might
otherwise be inconsistent with the State's federal system. The United
States has used both approaches . . . . Alternatively, federal States
may seek to adjust the treaty obligations themselves to avoid
federalism issues, for example, by limiting implementation
requirements to the 'national level.'
Id. at 314 n.44 (citations omitted) (discussing Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism:
Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1377
(2006)).
74. Challenging the UN, supra note 27, at 174; see also BENNETT & WALSH, supra
note 40, at 18 (citations omitted) ("The United States was a-if not the-key protagonist
in developing the 1961, 1971, and 1988 Conventions, as well as the 1972 protocol
amending the 1961 Convention; the United States has for decades been widely and
correctly viewed as the treaties' chief champion and defender.") (emphasis in original);
BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 336 ("Would it not be the ultimate paradox if the
currently fractured consensus were shattered by events within the cradle of prohibition
itself?"); RICHARDS, supra note 32, at 168. Richards writes:
It is disingenuous to suppose that the American criminal prohibition
of drug use is based on the secular concerns of criminogenesis and
control of drug-related injuries . . . . These arguments are, at best,
post hoc empirical makeweights for justifications of a different order,
namely, moralistic and paternalistic arguments of a peculiarly
American provenance.
Id.
75. See Challenging the UN, supra note 27, at 174. Bewley-Taylor opines:
As its staunchest defender, it is the US that provides the INCB with
the muscle to police the regime's disciplinary framework. Pressure
from Washington has long supplemented the moral legitimacy
bestowed upon the doctrine of prohibition by the UN. Such a US-UN
alliance represents a formidable source of inertia.
Id.; see also Neil Boister, Waltzing on the Vienna Consensus on Drug Control? Tensions
in the International System for the Control of Drugs, 29 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 389, 408-09
(2016) ("One cannot be sanguine about making predictions of major reform of the drug
control system; there is too much institutional inertia and too many States have bought
heavily into the current approach as the only possible way of controlling their domestic
drug problems."). Political consensus, both foreign and domestic, is crucial to treaty
longevity, and is the only way to break this cycle. BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 40, at
25 ("No treaty can survive the collapse of a political consensus supporting it. And no
treaty system can endure if it cannot cope with changing political conditions.
Sustainability in international law depends not only on commitment but also on
resilience and adaptability.") (emphasis in original).
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system serves as an implicit check on other nations that might consider
easing their own drug control policies.76 If that bulwark were removed,
then the treaties' power, already weak in the form of an advisory INCB,
would lose its teeth. Functionally, the United States provides a
majority of the funding for UN drug control organizations and could
exercise its power to dictate new enforcement priorities that do not
include marijuana to the same degree as other drugs.7 7 Because
political consensus is collapsing within the United States, at least with
regard to criminalizing cannabis, the international drug control
enforcement regime is under threat as its biggest proponent
withdraws.
The treaties may also have constitutional limitations.7 8 One
textual source of this complication is language in Article 3 of the 1988
Convention, which states:
Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system,
each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a
criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the
possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances
76. See DAVID R. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL 1909-97 (1999) ("As we have seen, the United States has effectively used
the UN in an effort to create a prohibitive norm for international drug control and
promote its own moral value system towards drug use in other nations. This it has
achieved by a combination of international treaty obligations and economic coercion.");
see also Carpenter, supra note 41, at 292, 294. Carpenter argues:
"Indeed, the United States has been, especially in recent decades, the
principal architect of that [international drug prohibition] structure.
Any decision by U.S. leaders to change policy and opt for the
legalization of drugs would therefore cause an array of international
complications. The prospect of such complications i not a sufficient
reason for rejecting the option of legalization . . .
Id. (emphasis added). For an analysis of Bolivia's recent renunciation and re-accession
to the treaties, see BENNErr & WALSH, supra note 40, at 23.
77. David R. Bewley-Taylor, Emerging Policy Contradictions Between the United
Nations Drug Control System and the Core Values of the United Nations, 16 INT'L J. OF
DRUG POL'Y 423, 429 (2005).
78. Challenging the UN, supra note 27, at 177. Bewley-Taylor writes:
Thus, if the highest courts in signatory nations ruled that prohibition
of a single drug (cannabis for example) or a selection of outlawed
substances, was unconstitutional then the Parties involved would no
longer be bound by the limitations of the Conventions with respect to
those drugs. Such action would be perfectly legitimate according to
the provisions of the treaties themselves.
Id. (citing Peter Webster, UN Treaties and the Legalization of Drugs, NARCO NEWS 2001
(Aug. 30, 2001), http://www.narconews.com/websterl.html [https://perma.cc/53Y8-
TDCC] (archived Oct. 31, 2016)). As dicussed elsewhere, this has occurred in the U.S.
See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
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for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the
1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, this language contains a
directive-criminalization-preceded by an important limitation.79
Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma have called this language an "escape
clause."8 0 More than a simple safety valve, this language recognizes an
inherent limitation in the treaties' power-enforcement of their
principles inherently relies on compliance of signatories in creating
criminalization regimes. A further complication is the extent to which
states within federal systems are bound by international treaties
acceded to by the federal entity.8 1
Domestic enforcement of drug law rests upon formal and informal
prosecutorial discretion.82 The scale and geographic breadth of drug
use in any nation necessarily demand that said nation compose and
enforce guidelines allowing prosecutors in disparate areas to deal with
problems in their communities. Indeed, the international drug treaties
reflect a shift over the years to emphasize drug trafficking control.
Because the government cannot possibly prosecute each infraction of
drug law, its efforts logically are constrained by resources and
priorities.8 3 For example, states suffering from addiction epidemics
may focus on rehabilitation once a defendant enters the criminal
justice system, whereas a border state would likely concern itself with
efforts to curtail trafficking within its borders. This applies to the
federal government, too. The very structure of the international
treaties governing drug control might be construed as a guideline for
prosecutorial discretion. Countries agree on priorities and a skeletal
79. 1988 Convention, supra note 54, art. 3.
80. DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR & MARTIN JELSMA, TRANSNATIONAL INST., THE UN
DRUG CONTROL CONVENTIONS: THE LIMITS OF LATITUDE 6 (2012),
https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlrl8.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAY6-56XJ] (archived
Nov. 11, 2016) [hereinafter LIMITS OF LATITUDE] ("Further, the article allows for
nonprosecution via a number of routes including expediency or public interest principles,
even though it restricts the application of such national discretionary powers when it
relates to trafficking offences.").
81. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48; see also BENNETT & WALSH, supra
note 40, at 15 n.35; LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 79 n.1 (1961). But see Hawken
& Kulick, supra note 59, at 356 ("[M]ost constitutional and international aw scholars
maintain that the Conventions do not bind member states with federal systems of
government to over-ride legalization in their constituent political units, no matter that
the spirit of the treaties does."). Practically speaking, of course, the INCB cannot compel
a sub-federal state to change its laws.
82. See Levine & Reinarman, supra note 22, at 259, 284 (discussing opposition
to drug laws by law enforcement officials who wish to de-prioritize minor drug arrests,
instances of judges refusing to enforce mandatory minimum statutes, and district
attorney perspectives on the success of the drug war).
83. CRICK, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing the federal government's minimal
resources for widespread drug enforcement).
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oversight structure, but the goals of the treaties are primarily
accomplished by member states through their own internal justice
systems.
One might characterize federal law as an instrument of
international law, and vice versa. But that picture is now complicated
by the tension between the law of US states and both federal and
international law. The federal government's approach, which
maintains the federal government's ability to reverse course or
intervene in marijuana-regulating states, will have the effect of
legalizing marijuana for millions. To some extent, to a medical
marijuana patient or a casual user, the international treaties and
federal laws may not mean much. But it is crucial for the United States
to craft a coherent approach that allows state experiments to proceed
and explains why its approach is consistent with the treaties' aims.
C. Assessments of the Treaty System & the Limitations of Such
Surveys
Two commentators have proposed a three-tier, traffic-light model
in assessing whether different drug control approaches violate treaty
norms.84 Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma posit that: (1) decriminalization,
drug consumption itself, possession and cultivation for personal use,
and harm reduction strategies are all permissible options for a state to
enact under the treaties;8 5 (2) drug consumption rooms, medical
marijuana, and Dutch coffee shops are contested or contestable options
under the treaty regime;86 and (3) regulated markets for non-medical
purposes are impermissible under the current treaty structure.8 7 This
traffic-light model, while helpful for assessing the limits of the treaties,
ignores the realities taking shape on the ground in US states: even if
regulated markets are technically impermissible, they are thriving.
The only question is how the treaty signatories proceed given this new
reality. The United States' best (and only8 8) option is to argue that the
84. See LIMITS OF LATITUDE, supra note 80.
85. Id. at 4-11.
86. Id. at 11-15.
87. Id. at 16-17.
88. Per the Congressional rider dicussed in United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d
1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2016), federal enforcement faces a dual challenge: (1) the
government has no desire to entirely do away with the international treaty regime,
especially for activities like drug trafficking that still draw federal interest; but of course,
(2), its power to interfere with state experimentation is extremely limited. Thus, the
federal government's argument is that the treaties are consistent with international
norms of prosecutorial discretion. What makes this stance desirable from the perspective
of international norms? The only way forward is to characterize the U.S. approach as
more in line with international norms like human rights, and to expand a reading of the
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federal exercise of prosecutorial discretion is permissible under the
treaty structures, and that this position is buttressed by human rights
and sovereignty considerations. The federal government's current
approach, purgatorial though it may seem at first glance, allows the
states ample latitude to experiment with the regulation of cannabis.
The approach also presents an argument that prosecutorial discretion
is allowed by the treaties; this enables the government to claim it
wants to pursue international drug control efforts governing drugs
other than marijuana.
D. The Path Forward
In the current state of discord between federal and state law
regarding marijuana, the federal government has several options in
constructing a response to the quickening pace of state action.
Legalizing marijuana at the federal level by placing cannabis outside
of the CSA8 9 would flagrantly disregard the core tenets of the
international regime. It would also endanger cooperation with US
partners abroad in drug operations the United States maintains an
interest in pursuing (e.g., combatting heroin smuggling). Allowing
states to opt out of the CSA and granting certain states conditional
waivers overseen by the Justice Department could constitute middle
ground steps. Assuming that the United States is interested in
maintaining its role, built up over decades, as a major player in
international narcotics treaty governance, the best avenue to pursue
would be to allow states to experiment with cannabis but limit federal
involvement in the mechanisms of state taxation. This would allow the
United States to maintain its position in the international community
with regard to other higher-harm drugs that remain illegal at the
federal level like heroin, while allowing state efforts to go forward.
treaties that focuses on domestic sovereignty. Although the Obama administration's
concerns with racial equality have faded into the background as the Trump
administration takes shape, those impacts can still be used to justify the federal
government's response to state efforts vis a vis the treaties.
89. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq (2012). Importantly, the
Department of Justice's power to reschedule cannabis is tied statutorily to the
obligations of the U.S. under the treaties. See MIKOS, supra note 3, at 272-75 (citing 21
U.S.C. § 811 (2012)); see also Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Drug
Enforcement Admin., 559 F.2d 735, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (cited by Mikos); see generally
Gerald F. Uelmen & Alex Kreit, Scheduling and U.S. treaty obligations, in DRUG ABUSE
AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK § 1:16 (Victor G. Haddox & Gerald F. Uelmen eds., 2016); id.
§ 3:85; Robert Mikos, Commentary, Forget Obamacare. Congress Should Repeal and
Replace This Instead., FORTUNE (Aug. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/04/senator-
cory-booker-marijuana-bill-justice-act-legalization/ [https://perma.cc/7JUJ-WLM3]
(archived Jan. 12, 2018).
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With regard to the international treaties themselves, the United
States can assert that its constructive laissez-faire policies towards
marijuana-permissive US states constitute valid exercises of
prosecutorial discretion. Both sovereignty and human rights
arguments support this position.9 0 While some commentators have
argued that international treaties do not bind the states,9 1 the federal
government's response to state legalization initiatives is what
matters-without federal sanction or blessing, state legalization
cannot succeed. Because state legalization must eventually exist
alongside, or at least, with the blessing of, the federal system, and
because the federal system must contemplate adherence to the
treaties, the international regime is relevant to state action.92 In
90. See infra Parts III & IV.
91. See, e.g., Keith Humphreys, Can the United Nations Block U.S. Marijuana
Legalization?, HUFFINGTON POST: WORLDPOsT (Sep. 24, 2013, 10:04 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-humphreys/can-the-united-nations-
b1ib 3977683.html [https://perma.cclWA4A-446L] (archived Nov. 6, 2016). Humphreys
originally opined:
The U.S. federal government is a signatory to the treaty, but the
States of Washington and Colorado are not. Countries with federated
systems of government like the U.S. and Germany can only make
international commitments regarding their national-level policies.
Constitutionally, U.S. states are simply not required to make
marijuana illegal as it is in federal law. Hence, the U.S. made no such
commitment on behalf of the 50 states in signing the UN drug control
treaties.
Id. Humphreys later updated his rather conclusory argument in a subsequent post.
Keith Humphreys, Understanding the U.N. Treaties, Federalism and Marijuana
Legalization, BOTEc ANALYSIS CORPORATION: THE REALITY-BASED COMMUNITY (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.samefacts.com/2013/10/drug-policy/understanding-the-u-n-treaties-
federalism-and-marijuana-legalization/ [https://perma.cclT5AW-LFLS] (archived Nov. 6,
2016). He wrote:
Now, both sides of the debate might say to me: Okay, so the state
actions were not violations of the UN treaties, but if the federal
government was bound by this treaty then the Attorney General was
required to sue Washington and Colorado to overturn their
legalization laws. This may well be correct from a legal point of view,
but from a substantive drug policy outcome viewpoint, it does not
make sense to me.
Id.
92. See NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS'N, supra note 72, at 3.
The authors write:
While each state has its own drug laws and controlled substances
acts (many of which mirror the CSA), federal law preempts, or
overrides, state law when it covers the same subject matter. And
since the Supremacy Clause of our nation's Constitution places
international treaties on the same legal footing as federal law, both
the Conventions and the federal drug laws preempt any conflicting
state law. So it could be said that while the international treaties do
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attempting to reconcile events on the ground with the text of the
treaties, one might conclude that the United States is in breach of the
treaties, but this conclusion is undesirable because it endangers the
treaties' survival. Instead, a "creative reading" is necessary to assert
that, in fact, the United States' actions are designed to (and in fact do)
protect the treaties' larger goals.9 3
The government's argument that its actions comply with the
treaties should rest on marijuana remaining illegal at the federal level,
and would emphasize the untenable dissonance and tension between
international marijuana control regimes and international values.94
There can be no doubt a conflict exists between the United States'
reading and the text of the treaties; but, to borrow Bewley-Taylor's
phrasing, a "creative reading" of the drug treatiess is a crucial
interpretive instrument in moving past the inertia and stasis
characterizing the current international narcotics control regime as it
relates to cannabis. The key to this creative reading is assessing
arguments for state sovereignty within the treaties themselves, and
incorporating into them a longstanding human rights critique of the
drug control system.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES SHOW THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL TREATIES ARE OUTLIERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM
Because the federal government must simultaneously administer
treaty compliance and may not spend any money enforcing the CSA
not, as a legal matter, directly apply to the states, as a practical and
political matter, they do.
Id. Bennett and Walsh similarly argue:
Tempting though it may be to view the tension between marijuana
reform and the drug treaties as a technical problem, much more than
procedural hygiene is at stake. Whether the United States and its
foreign interlocutors can adapt the three conventions to rapidly
increasing domestic tolerance for marijuana is a stress test, so to
speak, for the adaptability of today's international legal framework.
To preserve American interests in a host of other treaties- and in
the compliance that underpins them-we think the administration
and its treaty partners abroad should consider substantive changes
to the treaties themselves, so as to give international drug law the
flexibility it might well need in the years to come.
BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 40, at 3.
93. See supra text accompanying note 68.
94. Bewley-Taylor, Emerging Policy Contradictions, supra note 77, at 424-26
(discussing sovereignty, human rights, and international security as nodes of tension
afflicting drug control policy at the international level).
95. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 299.
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upon defendants compliant with state law, it can only argue that its
current position is desirable from a policy perspective. This outcome is
inherently unstable, so a change in language is necessary. The
executive branch must adopt new arguments to solidify the
reasonableness of its position. A human rights argument for relaxing
prohibitionist and punitive drug control regimes (or in a different
linguistic formulation, of the same concept, allowing US states to
reduce costs and raise revenue) emphasizes the social costs of
prohibition, the monetary costs of enforcement, the disproportionate
impact on minorities and vulnerable populations, the needs of patients
in distress, and the failure of the criminal law to administer equal
justice or reduce drug usage rates.
A. Introduction
These arguments are easily deployed from outside the drug
control system as a historical critique, as a political argument, and as
a sociological reading of available data. The human rights argument,
however, is difficult to make from within the system-from the position
of the Justice Department, or from the position of a US representative
to an international drug control body-simply because these
arguments assume and acknowledge the failures and abuses of the
system. The Justice Department would likely never admit that the
statute it administers, the CSA, has functioned as an instrument of
human rights violations. The human rights perspective also is hobbled
by the fact that it lacks limits.9 6
The problems of responsibility and extendibility, while important,
are inapposite. While each administration's goals may differ, one may
hew a rough sketch of a sensible schema for the United States' goals in
the international arena in light of state-level legalization efforts: allow
state experiments with cannabis law to proceed within reason, while
preserving the international drug control treaty regime to continue
operations against drug trafficking, criminal activity, and supply-side
efforts for "harder" drugs like opiates or cocaine. In other words, the
United States needs an argument that preserves the treaty regime, but
loosens the restrictions on cannabis; even more simply, the United
96. A human rights argument (namely, that human rights concerns compel
change in a prohibitionist drug control regime criminalizing possession and individual
use) could be extended from less harmful substances like cannabis to substances with
far greater public support for criminalization, lke crack cocaine. If racial disparities in
enforcement and incarceration persist across most classes of narcotics, then why should
the human rights argument not apply to "harder" drugs like crack cocaine or heroin?
This Note leaves for another day the application of human rights principles to other
criminalized substances.
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States needs a valid argument that allows for governments with sub-
national components to monitor different forms of regulation within its
borders.
Ignoring a human rights perspective is foolish because the United
States can advance it within the current treaty framework as a
rationale behind the 2013 and 2014 AG Guidelines.9 7 An admission by
the United States that its drug policies have been used as instruments
of human rights abuses would acknowledge an enormous problem, and
set an example moving forward that drug reform efforts are necessary.
The alternative to assembling these arguments is a breach of the
treaty, which is not in the United States' best interests. Outside of
formal amendment, a partial renunciation of the treaties as they relate
to marijuana, or ignoring the treaties entirely, the construction of an
argument along these lines can only serve to enhance US credibility
and stature.
"[T]he dominant prohibitive ethos of the UN drug control system
can be seen to be increasingly at odds with the Organization's position
on human rights."9 8 Referencing specific textual nodes of tension,
Bewley-Taylor points to the United Nations Charter: the Preamble;9 9
Article 1, T 3;100 Article 55, ¶ c; 01 and the Declaration of Human Rights
at Article 25.102 In a very general sense, the international drug control
treaties claim to derive their purpose from han interest in the health
97. See supra text accompanying note 64.
98. Bewley-Taylor, Emerging Policy Contradictions, supra note 77, at 425; see
also NEIL BOISTER, PENAL ASPECTS OF THE UN DRUG CONVENTIONS 524 (2001) ("Rights
to privacy, liberty, property, due process and so forth are all threatened by the
conventions, which do little to safeguard these rights.").
99. "We the people of the United Nations determined: . . . to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small[.]" U.N. Charter Preamble.
100. "[The Purposes of the United Nations are:] To achieve international
cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion[.]" Id. art. 1, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
101. 'With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:.. . . c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id. art. 55, ¶ c.
102. "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control." G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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and welfare of mankind.1 0 3 The 1988 Convention itself states that all
crop destruction measures "shall respect fundamental human rights
and shall take due account of traditional licit uses, where there is
historic evidence of such use, as well as the protection of the
environment."104 Despite this admonition, commentators consider this
language little more than a fig leaf for state-sanctioned human rights
violations. "[W]hat states are required to do under the drug treaties is
inherently questionable from a human rights perspective, considering
that they include obligations, the achievement of which requires
investigation, arrest, prosecution, imprisonment, restrictions on
freedom of speech (incitement), confiscation of property, extradition,
eradication of crops and other actions."1 os
This conflict between human rights norms and the requirements
of the drug treaties is important for two reasons. First, the entire
international legal system is in large measure focused around human
rights. Second, because the enforcement of any instrument depends on
consent and consensus, tension between drug control treaty
requirements and expectations of citizens of signatory nations could be
a death knell for the whole drug treaty regime. In many US states,
human rights arguments are already being advanced in favor of easing
103. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 297. Bewley-Taylor writes:
To be sure, an overriding emphasis on punitive prohibition
frequently threatens the regime's own ostensible concern with the
health and welfare of humankind. The manifestations of such a self-
defeating dynamic can be seen at various points on a drug policy
spectrum ranging from the handling of individual drug users to the
collateral damage caused by crop eradication and the militarized
pursuit of a 'war' on drug traffickers.
Id.; see also 1988 Convention, supra note 54, Preamble ("Deeply concerned by the
magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a serious threat to the health
and welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural and political
foundations of society . . . ."); 1972 Protocol, supra note 49, art. 12 (amending Single
Convention, supra note 39, art. 22) ("Whenever the prevailing conditions.. .render the
prohibition of the cultivation of ... the cannabis plant the most suitable measure, in its
opinion, for protecting the public health and welfare and preventing the diversion of
drugs into the illicit traffic, the Party concerned shall prohibit cultivation."); Single
Convention, supra note 39, Preamble ("Concerned with the health and welfare of
mankind. . . ."); Single Convention, supra note 39, art. 2, ¶ 5(b) ("A Party shall, if in its
opinion the prevailing conditions in its country render it the most appropriate means of
protecting the public health and welfare, prohibit the production, manufacture, export
and import of, trade in, possession or use of any such drug . . . ."); Single Convention,
supra note 39, art. 39 ("[A] Party shall not be . . . precluded from adopting measures of
control more strict or severe than those provided by this Convention ... as in its opinion
is necessary or desirable for the protection of the public health or welfare.").
104. 1988 Convention, supra note 54, art. 14, T 2 (emphasis added).
105. GDPO EXPERT SEMINAR REPORT, supra note 18, at 15.
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drug prohibitions. 1 06 From a human rights perspective, it is crucial to
recognize that calling cannabis a "controlled" substance is to badly
misstate the point; cannabis is a banned substance, but its production
and distribution are not controlled in the sense of a pharmaceutical or
a regulated product subject to various public health restrictions.1 0 7 A
human rights- and harm reduction-oriented system would allow the
state to "control" cannabis in the truer sense of the word, and, indeed,
medical marijuana statutes accomplish this feat by treating cannabis
as a substance fit for use within certain parameters.1 0 8 A right to use
medical marijuana is qualitatively easier to sell to the public from a
human rights perspective than a right to use marijuana recreationally;
this is why all recreational marijuana states first enacted medical
marijuana statutes.109
Apart from a theoretical or philosophical argument that all drug
use should be protected as a fundamental human right,1 10 scholars
106. See supra text accompanying note 17.
107. Eddy L. Engelsman, Cannabis Control: The Model of the WHO Tobacco
Control Treaty, 14 INT'L J. OF DRUG POL'Y 217, 218 (2003). Engelsman writes:
Cannabis like other illicit drugs is a so-called 'controlled drug'. A
closer look makes clear that these drugs are in fact far from being
'controlled'. The cultivation, trade, transport, wholesale distribution,
sale, and above all the unsafe composition, potency and quality of the
products are not controlled at all. Neither is the use. All this is a
threat to public health.
Id. But see MIKOS, supra note 3, at 201-02, 214 (discussing the fact that to re-schedule
cannabis under the CSA, it would be necessary to demonstrate its health value in a
system designed for pharmaceuticals). This is the ultimate catch-22, because the
government so heavily restricts research on cannabis. See Alex Kreit, Controlled
Substances, Uncontrolled Law, 6 ALB. GOV'T L. REv. 332, 352-58 (2013) (cited by Mikos).
108. The California Compassionate Use Act of 1996 states in part that one of its
purposes is:
To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and
use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is
deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who
has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use
of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic
pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness
for which marijuana provides relief.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2017).
109. See MIKOS, supra note 3, at 99.
110. See, e.g., Neil Hunt, Public Health or Human Rights: What Comes First?, 15
INT'L J. OF DRUG POL'Y 231-37 (2004); Erik van Ree, Drugs as a Human Right, 10 INT'L
J. OF DRUG POL'Y 89-98 (1998); see also RICHARDS, supra note 32, at 183 ("There is almost
no form of drug use which . . . may not advance important human goods, including the
capacity of some poor and deprived people to work more comfortably, to endure adverse
climactic and environmental circumstances, and in general to meet more robustly and
pleasurably the demands of their lives.") (citations omitted). For a contrary view, see




have argued that human rights norms demand that marijuana be
regulated differently. Two commentators, Piet Hein van Kemoen and
Masha Fedorova, have argued that the regulation and state control of
the marijuana trade are not only permissible, but required by human
rights obligations in certain circumstances.111 The efforts by US states
are an imperfect fit for this model, simply because those projects have
not been undertaken at the national level and are not explicitly
grounded solely in a human rights rationale in each instance.
Conversely, the human rights argument is easier to make for medical
marijuana than recreational marijuana. One could also argue that a
legalization regime with aspects of taxation encourages cannabis use
by implicitly imprinting the state's seal of approval on dispensaries; a
counter-argument would be that actively discouraging cannabis use is
too expensive and fruitless of an exercise for the state to involve itself
in. In addition, the decriminalization of marijuana in some states has
not alleviated the racial disparities in drug control enforcement
(problematizing requirement two of the commentators).112 But in
general, the argument is strong with regard to "softer" drugs like
cannabis, given that the principles of human rights and the
admonitions of the international drug control treaty regime are in
extreme tension.1 13
111. Press Release, Radboud Univ., International Law Allows for the Legalisation
of Cannabis (May 30, 2016),
http://www.ru.nl/english/news-agendanews/vm/law-0/aw/2016/international-law-
allows-legalisation-cannabis/ [https://perma.cc/S5HX-DYVG] (archived Jan. 7, 2017)
[hereinafter Van Kemoen / Fedorova Press Release]. Van Kemoen and Fedorova entitle
their study, "International Law and Cannabis II: regulation of cannabis cultivation and
trade for recreational use: positive human rights obligations versus UN Narcotic Drugs
Conventions." Only the Executive Summary has been published in English. I refer
hereinafter to this Executive Summary as "Van Kemoen / Fedorova Executive
Summary." The argument takes the following course: (1) positive human rights treaty
obligations justify the regulation of cannabis on public health, security, and crime control
grounds; (2) human rights treaty obligations supersede conflicting treaties under
international law (like the drug control treaties); (3) thus, states can regulate cannabis
legally under international law; and (4) certain conditions must be met in order to justify
regulation. Van Kemoen / Fedorova Executive Summary, supra, at 338. In other words,
because human rights obligations are more forceful than the drug control conventions,
those human rights obligations justify overriding the conventions in favor of regulating
cannabis. According to van Kemoen and Fedorova, in order to track this argument
correctly, any regulation legalizing cannabis must: (1) be "in the interest of the protection
of human rights"; (2) must show that the regulation itself will more effectively protect
human rights; (3) must have public support and be decided by a national democratic
process; (4) must ensure that the drug control system is closed, so as not to affect or
disadvantage other countries; and (5) must actively discourage cannabis use. Van
Kemoen / Fedorova Press Release, supra.
112. See infra text accompanying note 122.
113. See also UNIQUE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 40, at 29 ("If
there is a conflict between human rights and drug control as bodies of law, human rights
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B. Human Rights as a Counterbalance to the Drug Treaties
This tension extends to legal and public health perspectives.
There can be no doubt that the international drug control regime has
failed to improve health in its signatory states.1 1 4 From a legal
perspective, the human rights treaties carry more legal force than the
drug control treaties.115 "More than a mere counter-balance to drug
control treaties, human rights law occupies a position of much greater
legal authority."1 1 6 Therefore, the argument here is not necessarily
that the drug control conventions themselves constitute or lead to
human rights abuses, but that the treaty system cannot be separated
from domestic drug control policy, which itself could be problematic
from a human rights standpoint.11 7 Obligations to criminalize certain
behaviors and compulsory property confiscation all relate to human
rights issues like abridgement of civil rights, mass incarceration, and
public health. 1
Users of illegal drugs are frequently subject to human rights
abuses."9 By criminalizing the behaviors of certain vulnerable social
law must take precedence. This is clear from the Charter and confirmed by the highest
policy-making body in the UN.").
114. See Robin Room & Peter Reuter, How Well Do International Drug
Conventions Protect Public Health?, 379 THE LANCET 84, 88 (2012). Room and Reuter
argue:
[T]o separate the effects of the treaties from the effects of the national
policies implemented in accordance with their provisions is
impossible . . . . [C]riminalisation of the non-medical use of these
drugs ensures that we have poor data on the extent of and the harm
caused by their use. These challenges notwithstanding, to argue that
the effects have been beneficial is difficult.
Id. (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying note 30.
115. RECALIBRATING THE REGIME, supra note 27, at 7, 20-23; see also BEWLEY-
TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 139-41.
116. RECALIBRATING THE REGIME, supra note 27, at 43. The authors argue:
It is clear that human rights have a higher standing [than drug
control] in the Charter and therefore in the UN system. If there is a
conflict between drug control and the human rights obligations in the
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
protection of human rights must be the priority.
Id. at 43.
117. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 140 (discussing Barrett & Novak, supra
note 29, at 449-77, and noting that the U.N. drug convention "adopt[s] a restrictive
punitive approach to drug users with little acknolwledgement of human rights
obligations").
118. Barrett & Novak, supra note 29, at 456.
119. RECALIBRATING THE REGIME, supra note 27, at 11 ("They are a group that is
vulnerable to a wide array of human rights violations, including abusive law enforcement
practices, mass incarceration, extrajudicial execution, denial of health services, and, in
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groups, the drug conventions arguably criminalize those groups
themselves.120 In the United States, the question is one of
proportionality: are the punishments imposed for drug use
proportional to the threat that drugs like cannabis pose to society? If
not, who pays the costs of that disproportionality?121 Mandatory
minimum sentencing and racial disparities in enforcement are just a
few American examples of this phenomenon; to illustrate, African
American men are incarcerated for drug offenses 13.4 times more often
than white men.122 Domestic drug laws often function as instruments
that, far from contributing positively to the health of the citizenry,
work instead to abridge human and civil rights.123 When laws begin to
facilitate outcomes that are at odds with the goals of a society, then
those norms demand re-examination.124
C. Private & Public Use
The powers of the American state to control drug use extend into
the most private zones of citizens' lives, further calling into question
the justifications for such actions.125 The exercise of these powers
arguably perpetuates injustice rather than achieving some abstract
measure of moral societal purity.126 In dealing with controlled
some countries, execution under legislation that fails to meet international human rights
standards.").
120. Barrett & Novak, supra note 29, at 456 ("Unlike human rights law, which
focuses . . . on the protection of the most vulnerable, the drug conventions criminalise s
specifically vulnerable groups. They criminalise people who use drugs, known to be
vulnerable to HIV, homelessness, discrimination, violence, and premature death. . . .").
121. RECALIBRATING THE REGIME, supra note 27, at 41-42; see also Norbert
Gilmore, Drug Use and Human Rights: Privacy, Vulnerability, Disability, and Human
Rights Infringements, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 355, 414 (1996).
122. RECALIBRATING THE REGIME, supra note 27, at 41.
123. Gilmore, supra note 121, at 362-63.
124. RICHARDS, supra note 32, at 185-86 ("A corollary of this way of thinking
[harm reduction] is that, when the scope of the criminal law exceeds such moral
constraints, it violates human rights. The constitutional right to privacy expresses a
form of this moral criticism of unjust overcriminalization .
125. Gilmore argues:
Efforts to control the supply of drugs include broad police powers to
discover and interdict the illicit production, distribution, sale and
possession of prohibited drugs, the power to seize assets relating to
these illicit activities, the power to prosecute and punish offenders,
and the power to require drug users to undergo medical treatment.
Gilmore, supra note 121, at 401.
126. RICHARDS, supra note 32, at 181 ("[Sjtrong principles of justice, consistent
with the autonomy-based interpretation of treating person as equals, require that person
should have equal prospects for self-respect and well-being . . . [c]riminalization of drug
use, however, does not advance these ends; indeed it perversely aggravates injustice.").
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substances, the state confronts a complex balancing act: keeping its
citizens healthy by limiting access to harmful substances; ensuring
that addicts receive treatment in conjunction with or instead of a
criminal penalty; minimizing intrusions onto private property; and
reducing criminal activity associated with drug use and trafficking.127
A common problem in this balancing act is the conflation of trafficking
with consumption.1 28
Public drug use presents the state with a different set of problems
than private drug use because the government has an interest in
keeping public spaces free of intoxicated individuals. To borrow
Gilmore's terminology, we might distinguish between "voluntary and
innocuous" drug use and "compulsive and likely harmful drug use."12 9
"Innocuous" drug use in this schema could include activities like
occasionally drinking coffee or alcohol or smoking tobacco; these
activities may be harmful to the self or others, but society recognizes
that the costs of banning these practices are significant.130 Outside of
this zone of legality, though, "most drug use is transient,
noncompulsive, and innocuous."13 1 Harm reduction and supply
control 32 are consistent with positive human rights obligations of the
government.1 3 3
Gilmore has argued that private drug use has at least four human
rights implications: (1) prohibiting private drug use must be "the least
restrictive and intrusive intervention available to prevent the risks
127. Hendriks & Tomasevski, supra note 29, at 53.
128. Hendriks and Tomasevski argue:
Although drug consumption and the trafficking in drugs are very
distinct issues, policy measures adopted to control drugs have not
always clearly distinguished between these two aspects of the 'drug
problem.' This text argues that the prevalent linking of these two
issues has resulted in the conceptual confusion regarding the
application of human rights in drug control, where argumentation in
favour of applying human rights is erroneously identified with
advocacy for legalization of drugs or abandonment of the suppression
of drug trafficking.
Id.
129. Gilmore, supra note 121, at 410.
130. Id. at 411.
131. Id. at 412. It is important to note that this formulation of drug use refers to
noncompulsive drug use; in other words, this schema does not include addictive drugs
like opiates.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
133. Gilmore, supra note 121, at 416 n.241; see also Jos Silvis, The History ofDrug
Control with Regard to Human Rights, in DRUG USE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE,
supra note 29, at 33, 49 ("But if repressive politics in the field of drugs has no perspective
of reducing or limiting the problems surrounding the use of drugs, and if it doesn't
prevent its use, then the infringements from the State in private affairs is more
problematic, because there is no competing value being served.").
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and harms of drug use"; (2) if drug use is a largely private activity, then
the government's focus should be on public health-oriented
interventions rather than supply control; (3) understanding drug use
as a private activity reduces opportunities for human rights
infringements through violations of the Fourth Amendment; and (4)
"considering drug use to be a private behavior would help decrease the
stigmatization and scapegoating of drug users."i34 One might
understand state-level cannabis regulation regimes as exercises in a
different schema of drug policy. These changes are exercises in harm
reduction triage because they do not claim to solve all of the problems
created by drugs like cannabis, but focus law enforcement resources
elsewhere. Under Gilmore's analysis, states are becoming more
tolerant of private drug use occurring outside of the public sphere
(driving, public use), and this outcome brings prohibitions on drug use
more in line with human rights norms. It is crucial to crystallize the
sometimes-nebulous concept of human rights into the experiences of
drug users on the ground.s
With attitudes changing so quickly, the United States must
address the tensions between the drug control treaties it signed and
the human rights principles animating the entire international
system. Cannabis simply presents the best opportunity to rethink the
treaties, given that United States domestic law is changing with such
speed. An essential argument the United States should make brings
these human rights concerns to the fore and keeps them on the table
for future discussions about other narcotics. Simply ignoring the
treaties does nothing for US credibility abroad-cannabis is an issue
where the United States can take the lead in rethinking its
international obligations and maintain its position as a chief proponent
of international drug control. Human rights abuses in the name of drug
control are carried out every day in American neighborhoods and cities,
and an acknowledgement of this reality gives the United States
134. Gilmore, supra note 121, at 415-17.
135. Gilmore offers eleven situations in which drug control policies directly and
concretely affect the human rights of users: (1) privacy breaches; (2) "absent or
diminished due process"; (3) rules of criminal procedure applied specifically to users of
narcotics, which diminishes or corrupts a presumption of innocence; (4) arbitrary and
excessive detentions; (5) reduced access to healthcare; (6) reduced employment
opportunities; (7) reduced housing opportunities; (8) reduced educational opportunities;
(9) exclusion from travel and immigration; (10) reduced eligibility for insurance; and (11)
wrongful discrimination. Id. at 444-46. These situations are applicable to users of all
drugs, but are especially relevant to cannabis. Each of these harms has been visited on
American cannabis users. Private and public tension is especially great when a relatively
non-harmful private behavior affects an individual's rights in the public sphere.
Abridgement of those rights under such circumstances could be construed as a human
rights violation.
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credibility to leverage in leading a formal reassessment of the
treaties.13 6
Although international drug control regimes and human rights
law developed side by side, the drug control treaties were produced and
modified in "an artificial legal vacuum."1 37 That is, the two systems
developed concurrently without comingling.3 8 Drug policy was
specifically omitted from mention in the U.N. Charter; the signatories
understood the subject to rest under the umbrella of development
rather than law enforcement.13 9 In more recent years, the U.N.
General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for drug control
efforts that comply with the human rights provisions of the Charter.140
The principles in the U.N. Charter and the more recent moves in the
General Assembly represent the wiser conception of human rights as
applied to drug control.
Articulating a human rights approach to drug control is no mere
abstract exercise. "Human rights law recognises that without certain
civil and political rights being guaranteed, economic, social and
cultural rights will remain out of reach."1 4 1 A human rights approach
to drug control would entail elevating well-being and harm reduction
over a demand and supply reduction strategy: "placing demand and
supply reduction as overall objectives or strategy pillars is to confuse
goals, processes and outcomes. The goal, for example, is not demand
reduction per se. It is, among other concerns, improved health. And the
strategy is not demand reduction; it is, for example, prevention and
treatment."14 2
Allowing certain US states to regulate marijuana is a step in the
right direction in bringing the drug treaties into line with human
rights norms, because regulation removes the drug from criminal
markets and lifts its users out of the criminal justice system. The
conventions, in a sense, are backwards because they do not
contemplate curing the root causes of drug abuse. In fact, they
perpetuate the problem by continuing to require local criminalization
in the face of overwhelming evidence that the criminal market for
narcotics remains robust.14 3 Although the drug treaties are silent as to
136. Gilmore, supra note 121, at 362.
137. Barrett & Novak, supra note 29, at 457.
138. Id. at 457-58.
139. Id. at 459.
140. Id. at 450 (discussing G.A. Res. 63/197, T 1 (Mar. 6, 2009)). The INCB has for
the most part failed to discuss human rights. See also BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at
148 (noting the rising international support for reform).
141. Barrett & Novak, supra note 29, at 460.
142. Id. at 468 (emphasis in original).
143. Barrett and Novak state:
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proportionate penalties for drug use, "[i]f a measure cannot or has not
achieved its stated aim, can it be considered necessary or
proportionate?"144 Cannabis is the best place to start.
IV. A TRUE SAFETY VALVE? A SOVEREIGNTY ARGUMENT FOR
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL TREATIES.
A second set of arguments is useful in seeing the US approach as
logical and productive: the drug treaties themselves contain provisions
regarding signatory sovereignty. Crucially, treaty enforcement rests on
the powers of the enforcer, which itself, at least in the United States,
is far from unitary. The president, local prosecutors, state legislators,
federal drug authorities, and activists all play important roles in
enforcement. Each of these actors agitates within his or her sphere to
extend or limit sovereign power. As a result, enforcement of a treaty
obligation is not a simple matter.
A. Sovereignty & Treaty Enforcement in a Federal System
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "a party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty."145 The Single Convention states, "The
parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures as may
be necessary . . . [t]o give effect to and carry out the provisions of this
Convention within their own territories . . . ."146 The Conventions
But none of the conventions make reference to poverty,
discrimination or social exclusion, well known to act as push factors
towards the drug trade and as significant risk factors for drug
dependence and drug related harms. Instead, they focus on drug use
and supply - visible symptoms, not root causes. Indeed, for many,
the problem being addressed within the conventions is one which
they themselves perpetuate - the criminal market for drugs.
Id. at 462 (citations omitted).
144. Id..at 463, 469.
145. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Note that the U.S. is a signatory but not
a party. Frequently Asked Questions: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S.
DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2017) [https://perma.cc/N5MF-WJPR] (archived Jan. 10, 2017) ("The United States
considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
constitute customary international law on the law of treaties."). Article 62 of the Vienna
Convention also contains a changed circumstances clause, but the change must have
been unforeseen by the parties at the time of signing. Vienna Convention, supra, art. 62.
146. Single Convention, supra note 39, art. 4.
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themselves do "not establish binding domestic law; rather [they] must
be implemented through domestic legislation."147 With regard to
implementation in a federal system-that is, a system of government
like the United States or Germany, with a centralized federal
government sitting above provincial entities like states-Boister has
argued that "a federal state cannot justify its failure to perform a treaty
obligation because of any special features of its constitutional system
unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself."148 This issue is more
complex than Boister recognizes,149 and, while the INCB has adopted
this position,15 0 scholars have not unanimously endorsed this
proposition.151 Because the international drug control treaties are not
self-executing,15 2 the United States enforces its international
147. CRICK, supra note 7, at 20.
148. Boister, supra note 75, at 405 (quoting and discussing LORD MCNAIR, supra
note 81, at 78-81 (1961)); see also id. at 79 n.1 (1961). McNair writes: .
The division of powers in Federal States between the Federal
Government and the Governments of the States or Provinces gives
rise to special problems. Normally the treaty-making capacity
resides in the Federal Government, while the legislative power is
divided between the Federal Government and the Governments of
the States or Provinces. The principle is clear that if the Federal
Government concludes a valid treaty, it is responsible for seeing that
is performed.
Id. (emphasis added).
149. "[T]he longstanding doctrine of state responsibility holds nations exclusively
responsible for the conduct of constituent territorial units under international law."
Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567,
580 n.47 (1997) (collecting other authorities). But see Hawken & Kulick, supra note 59,
at 356 ("[Mlost constitutional and international law scholars maintain that the
Conventions do not bind member states with federal systems of government o over-ride
legalization in their constituent political units, no matter that the spirit of the treaties
does.") (emphasis added).
150. The INCB has taken the position that "[i]f a State, irrespective of its
constitutional framework and legal system, enters into an international agreement ...
that State must ensure that all state andlor provincial policies and measures do not
undermine its efforts to combat drug abuse and trafficking in narcotic drugs,
psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals." Int'l Narcotics Control Bd, Rep. of the
Intl' Narcotics Control Bd. for 2011, ¶ 287, U.N. Doc E/INCB/2011/1 (Feb. 28, 2012); see
also Alice P. Mead, International Control of Cannabis, in HANDBOOK OF CANNABIS 50
(Roger Pertwee ed., 2014).
151. Tom Grant, Who Can Make Treaties? Other Subjects of International Law, in
THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES, supra note 73, at 125, 146 ("[T]he view has not been
unanimous that only the [national] State may hold responsibility [for a breach].
Lauterpacht accepted that, under certain circumstances, the constituent [sub-federal]
unit could act separately, and thus it would be to that unit, not the State, that
responsibility [for a breach] would attach.").
152. TNI Briefing for the 2003 UNGASS Mid-Term Review, TRANSNAT'L INST.
(Mar. 2003), http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/un-drug-control/conventions/item/2185-
un-drug-conventions-reform [https://perma.cc/6S7J-KPMT] (archived Jan. 10, 2017)
('The UN Drug Conventions are not self-executing. The implementation of . . . the
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obligations through a federal statute, the CSA. But US federal power
over state law is limited in many ways.
US federal drug control strategy contemplates not just the
cooperation of states but, by design, envisions states as leading the
charge on drug control: practically, this means that the states are
prosecuting drug-related offenses like possession, distribution, and
manufacture.'5 3 Federal systems in other international law contexts
often closely track this model of delegation.154 The "willingness of state
law enforcement officials to enforce" drug policy underpins the entire
US domestic enforcement system.15 5 The CSA itself enshrines both
prosecutorial discretion5 6 and state cooperation57 into law.
On an even more basic level, the federal government cannot
compel states to change their own statutes,15 8 and it cannot
commandeer state law.1 59 Indeed, the outright elimination of all state-
Conventions is left to the parties themselves. This leaves room for interpretation,
allowing countries to develop a differentiated national drug policy. However, this
latitude is not unlimited. In general, the Conventions require loyal enforcement by the
parties.").
153. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 169 (noting that the "vast majority" of
cannabis possession actions are prosecuted under state statutes in state courts).
154. See Karagiannis, supra note 73, at 313-14. Karagiannis writes:
Besides [national] States endowed with overseas territories, federal
States also present difficulties as far as the territorial application of
treaties. The crux of the problem is that international law ... enables
only federal States to enter into international treaties. But many
federal States' constitutions entitle their sub-federal governmental
units (states, Lander, regions, provinces, or cantons) to implement -
either exclusively or concurrently - the measures necessary for the
federal State to comply with a treaty. In important areas, such as
criminal law, human rights law, environmental law, and civil law,
the federal State may simply lack domestic legal authority to apply
treaty provisions in the absence of implementation by the sub-federal
unit that the federal State may have no authority to require.
Id. (citations omitted) (referencing Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New
Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1371-72 (2006)).
155. CRICK, supra note 7, at 14.
156. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C. § 871(b) (2012) ("The Attorney General may promulgate and enforce any rules,
regulations, and procedures which he may deem necessary and appropriate for the
efficient execution of his functions under this subchapter.").
157. See id. § 873(a)(7) (authorizing the Attorney General to enter into contractual
.agreements with the states "to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory
activities under this chapter.").
158. Boister, supra note 75, at 405 n.122.
159. See Robert Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the
States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1419, 1446 ("the
anticommandeering rule constrains Congress's power to preempt state law in at least
one increasingly important circumstance-namely, when state law simply permits private
conduct to occur-because preemption of such a law would be tantamount to
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level criminal penalties for possession and use of cannabis is a less
desirable result for the federal government than a state regime
regulating the drug; if the states removed all prohibitions on drug use,
there would effectively be no penalty for cannabis use because the
executive branch lacks the resources to enforce the CSA everywhere.160
"[F]ederal 'success' in blocking [Colorado and Washington's] new laws,
were it achievable, would really embody a defeat for federal interests;
it would likely upend the regulatory component of the states' new
systems but leave intact the repeal of state prohibitions against
commandeering."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and
Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015). The authors state:
Because Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to
prohibit even the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana,
no state can erect a legal shield protecting its citizens from the reach
of the CSA. But at the same time, states'decisions to eliminate state
marijuana prohibitions are simply beyond the power of the federal
government. The federal government cannot command any state
government o criminalize marijuana conduct under state law. From
that incontrovertible premise flows the conclusion that if states wish
to repeal existing marijuana laws or partially repeal those laws, they
may do so without running afoul of federal preemption.
Id. at 103 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). By that same token, "it appears that the
executive branch often may opt not to act on . .. judicial pronouncements of its authority
[to sue state agencies to carry out treaty obligations to foreign powers] and may invoke
federalism to explain why." Hollis, supra note 154 at 1384-94.
160. Chemerinsky et al.'s thought experiment on this point bears repetition in
full:
Imagine that the day after repealing all its marijuana laws, [a] state
enacted a new regulatory scheme under which only adults twenty-
one and over would be allowed to possess marijuana and only up to
one ounce. Assume further that this new state regulatory scheme
empowered local jurisdictions to license commercial cultivation and
the sale of marijuana to adults; production and sales conforming to
these regulations-but only such sales-would now be permitted.
Under these new state regulations, possession of more than one
ounce, unlicensed cultivation or sale, and distribution of marijuana
to a minor would all become new criminal offenses. Enacting these
new state laws, creating a tightly regulated marijuana market, and
adding new criminal penalties, could not be deemed an obstacle to
the CSA's objectives of 'combating drug abuse and controlling the
legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.' The
state's new laws are a greater support to the federal goals on day two
than they were on day one. On day one the state permitted all
marijuana activity; on day two it prohibited most marijuana activity,
permitting only regulated sales and possession of small amounts. If
the state can remove all its marijuana prohibitions on day one
despite the CSA's prohibition and despite the Supremacy Clause--
and it clearly can-the state can certainly add some prohibitions back
on day two without running afoul of the CSA.
Chemerinsky, supra note 159, at 112 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also
Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 159 at 1464.
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marijuana."161 In sum, if the federal government loses its state-level
enforcement partners for cannabis regulation, there is little the federal
government can do to stop citizens from using the drug.
Indeed, some scholars have argued that the federal authorities
would do well to work with states, as an outright crackdown on static
policies would lead to the de facto legalization of cannabis.162 An
outright crackdown is highly undesirable, even from the perspective of
perpetuating the CSA, because it removes the state entirely from the
regulation of the drug.163 By way of analogy, in the human rights law
context, "[t]he U.S. government retains ultimate responsibility for
treaty compliance and thus may be held responsible under
international law if its constituent states fail to implement
international human rights obligations."164 But just as with drug
control, federal enforcement, power over state action is better
understood as quite limited.165
161. BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 40, at 4; see also id. at 12; TODD GARVEY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE,
FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 7 (2012),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42398.pdf [https://perma.cc/E93W-6396] (archived Feb. 18,
2017).
162. CRICK, supra note 7, at 14 n.152 (discussing JONATHAN RAUCH, BROOKINGS
INST., WASHINGTON VERSUS WASHINGTON (AND COLORADO): WHY THE STATES SHOULD
LEAD ON MARIJUANA POLICY 3 (2013), https://www.brookings.edulwp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Washington-Versus-Washington-and-ColoradoRauch-v17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PS8-5MNJ] (archived Jan. 19, 2017)); see also Mark A.R. Kleinman,
Cooperative Enforcement Agreements and Policy Waivers: New Options for Federal
Accommodation to State-Level Cannabis Legalization, 6 DRUG POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 4
(2013).
163. See RAUCH, supra note 162, opining:
Legally speaking, then, the federal government cannot prevent the
states from removing their troops from the battlefield; practically
speaking, it cannot enforce the CSA by itself. The implication is that
it might be impractical, counterproductive, or both for the federal
government to attempt to impose a 'zero tolerance' model on Colorado
and Washington, which legalize but regulate marijuana, because
they or other states might respond by simply legalizing marijuana
without regulating it-almost certainly a worse outcome from a
federal point of view. Instead, the federal government might better
serve the policy goals of the CSA by working with Colorado and
Washington to focus federal and state enforcement on high federal
priorities, such as preventing legalized marijuana from spilling
across state borders, rather than on trying to shut down the states'
experiments.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
164. Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and
International Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 359, 384 (2006).
165. Id. at 384 n.125 (citing and discussing Spiro, supra note 149, at 572-78).
Spiro notes that, "The federal government has persistently refused to correct state
practices which may violate international human rights" because of concerns about
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B. The History of State-Level Cannabis Regulation & Differentiation
as Productive
In the United States, state differentiation of cannabis policy has
been present since the 1970s. In 1975, Alaska's Supreme Court found
that the right to privacy prevented the state from banning personal
possession and use of cannabis.16 6 The Ravin decision, like the
Netherlands' drug. policy, demonstrates that the domestic and
international drug control system, while disclaiming tolerance for local
differentiation in enforcement priorities, has always contained a
multiplicity of perspectives on cannabis control. The federal strategy
in the Obama era towards the drug control treaties was to embrace this
differentiation rather than sweeping it under the rug.167 The Trump
administration has not yet deviated from this course.
federalism. Spiro, supra note 149, at 572-73. Despite this parallel track of non-
enforcement, if the U.S. advanced a human rights argument as a reason behind its choice
to exercise prosecutorial discretion with regard to state cannabis regulation, then the
most receptive body in the world to such arguments is likely the United Nations. In other
words, the U.S.'s invocation of a human rights argument in this context would carry the
greatest weight.
166. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 189 (discussing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d
494 (Alaska 1975)). The Ravin Court opined:
Thus, we conclude that citizens of the State of Alaska have a basic
right to privacy in their homes under Alaska's constitution. This
right to privacy would encompass the possession and ingestion of
substances uch as marijuana in a purely personal, non-commercial
context in the home unless the state can meet its substantial burden
and show that proscription of possession of marijuana in the home is
supportable by achievement of a legitimate state interest.
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
167. In 2014, Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield discussed this
federalist differentiation as it relates to the enforcement of the drug treaties. He outlined
four "pillars" of U.S. policy towards the drug treaties upon which he hoped an
international consensus would converge. BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 40, at 8-9.
These "pillars" are: (1) ensuring the treaties' integrity by adjusting the older treaties,
and avoiding the adoption of new treaties; (2) flexibly interpreting the treaties as "living
documents"; (3) "tolerating different national strategies or policies"; and (4) working
against international criminal organizations. Id. President Obama made similar
arguments, stating:
The U.N. drug conventions, which recognize that the suppression of
international drug trafficking demands urgent attention and the
highest priority, allow sovereign nations the flexibility to develop and
adapt new policies and programs in keeping with their own national
circumstances while retaining their focus on achieving the
conventions' aim of ensuring the availability of controlled substances
for medical and scientific purposes, preventing abuse and addiction,
and suppressing drug trafficking and related criminal activities. The
United States supports the view of most countries that revising the
U.N. drug conventions is not a prerequisite to advancing the common
288 [VOL. 51:247
CONSTRUCTINGA "CREATIVE READING"
Because the CSA incorporates the drug treaties by reference, re-
scheduling cannabis is not something the executive can do with the
stroke of a pen.16 8 But conversely, the executive's interpretation of a
treaty is entitled to deference.16 9 Reading between the lines of this
publicly articulated strategy, the federal government's approach is
designed to'ensure that state experimentation can proceed while the
international drug treaties remain in force. More broadly, the Obama
administration tried to simultaneously prevent ossification of the older
treaties, preclude the adoption of newer treaties that might reduce the
US role in international drug control, and interfere as little as possible
with many states that have decided to decriminalize or legalize
cannabis in different ways.
There is a fundamental and widening dissonance between what is
happening in US states on the ground and outdated interpretations of
the drug control treaties' text. If state experiments proceed at the same
rate they have been occurring for the past en years, then the question
is not whether the treaties have been formally breached, but to what
extent the international community wants this treaty regime to
survive, and even thrive, in the context of this already-transpiring
reality. That is the more fundamental goal here, and a flexible
approach to the treaties accomplishes that goal.
Sovereign discretion over enforcement was not contemplated in
the earlier drug treaties, but is present in the 1988 Convention.7 0 One
relevant portion of the 1988 Convention states:
The Parties shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers under
their domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences established
in accordance with this article are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law
and shared responsibility of international cooperation designed to
enhance the positive goals we have set to counter illegal drugs and
crime.
Id. at 10-11. Academic reaction to the four pillars strategy was skeptical. One report
called the arguments "legally unpersuasive and problematic" and concluded that a
"unilateral interpretation of international laws sets a risky precedent for treaty
adherence in other areas, including arms control and human rights." GDPO EXPERT
SEMINAR REPORT, supra note 18, at 21.
168. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 811(d) (West 2017).
169. David Sloss, Domestic Application of Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES, supra note 73, at 367, 384 ("The United States may be the only State where
courts have adopted an explicit interpretive presumption favouring deference to the
executive branch on treaty interpretation issues.") (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491, 513 (2008)).
170. BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 40, at 11 ("The 1961 and 1971 Conventions
do not specifically address the issue of enforcement discretion, and thus don't obviously
seem to cabin its ordinary exercise by governments; for its part, the 1988 Convention
explicitly recognized states' discretion with respect to Convention-required offenses.")
(citing 1988 Convention, supra note 54, art. 3(6)).
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enforcement measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the
need to deter the commission of such offences.1 7 1
Article 3 also contains limiting language discussing the constitutional
principles of a signatory's legal system.172 Additionally, the
commentary accompanying the 1988 Convention specifically
referenced prosecutorial discretion as an example of the basic concepts
of a legal system upon which a country could rely in designing
enforcement structures.1 7 3 This language provides a domestic outlet
for differing visions on personal use of cannabis, and "the article allows
for non-prosecution via a number of routes including expediency or
public interest principles, even though it restricts the application of
such national discretionary powers when it relates to trafficking
offenses."174 One could argue that the Ravin case pursued this exact
route as a judicial determination that Alaska's constitution could not
tolerate limits on private cannabis consumption in the home.1 75
Canadian and Colombian courts have also ruled that cannabis
criminalization is invalid in certain contexts.1 76 Indeed, under this
provision:
As a result, a country might rule that, in line with its own national
circumstances, it is not within the interest of society to prosecute for drug
possession for personal use, that the right to privacy overrules state intervention
regarding what people consume or possess in their private homes, or that self-
destructive behaviour-be it consumption of potentially harmful substances or
other behaviour up to suicide-shall not be subject to punishment.1 7 7
A respect for domestic law and prosecutorial discretion is also
embedded in Article 3(11) of the 1988 Convention and Article 36(4) of
the Single Convention.1 7 8 So while it may be said that the treaties have
some "safety valves" for domestic law,1 79 especially with regard to the
171. Id.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
173. Aoyagi, supra note 30, at 591-92 nn.141-42 (referencing the Dutch policies
of drug control as "underl[ying] the dichotomy between law-on-the-books' and 'law-in-
action"'). Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the longstanding existence of the Dutch
cannabis control system, with its mix of technical illegality and practical availability,
with the treaties' text; the analogies to the new U.S. state systems are easy to make.
174. LIMITS OF LATITUDE, supra note 80, at 6.
175. See supra text accompanying note 166.
176. Mead, supra note 150, at 50.
177. LIMITS OF LATITUDE, supra note 80, at 6.
178. Boister, supra note 75, at 405 n.126.
179. Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma describe this "escape clause" as a "relative rarity"
in international law. See LIMITS OF LATITUDE, supra note 80, at 12 n.26 (discussing the
limits to which a country that is a signatory to a treaty may use its "domestic legal
system as a justification for not complying with international rules").
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personal consumption of cannabis,18 0 a reading of these provisions as
allowing for regulated markets of cannabis-complete with taxation
and quality standards-is strained. But of course, a strained reading-
to the mind of a policymaker looking to preserve some components of
the treaties-is far more desirable than an overly technical reading
that a breach has occurred.
One problem with this "safety valve" argument is that it could
potentially be extended to any international obligation: "[T]his
approach must be applied with circumspection, and perhaps only to
minor offenses, since it could be employed to avoid any or perhaps all
international obligations, thereby undermining the entire treaty
system."8 1 True, but recall that the federal government has limited
power to contain or change what the states are doing. That reality
above all else should legitimize a creative reading that puts these
domestic outlet clauses into a new, brighter light. 8 2 Countries are
empowered to consider "mitigating circumstances" in tempering and
adapting their enforcement efforts.1 83 While the United States' current -
policy may push the drug treaties to the outer bounds of interpretation,
180. PENAL ASPECTS OF THE UN DRUG CONVENTIONS, supra note 98, at 125-27
(citations omitted) ("Whether legislative decriminalization of, for example possession of
cannabis, could be seen to be part of the 'basic concepts' of a legal system and thus also
escape article 3(2)'s obligation is unclear.").
181. Mead, supra note 150, at 50 (citing Krzsztof Krajewski, How Flexible are the
United Nations Drug Conventions?, 10 INT'L J. OF DRUG POLY 329 (1999)).
182. It is important to understand the limits of interpretation. "Safeguard
clauses of this kind are not blanket opts-outs for non-performance of specific obligations
unless the domestic law prevents compliance with the particular obligation." Boister,
supra note 75, at 406-07. Boister argues that the U.S.'s position amounts to more than
an exercise of prosecutorial discretion on a case by case basis. See generally id. At a
certain point, when an exception begins to swallow the rule, the discretion contemplated
by the treaties is likely being abused. Bennett and Walsh maintain a similar position:
"[i]t is one thing to stay enforcement's hand, and instead to invoke alternatives to
incarceration; but it is quite another to announce, in so many words, a qualified tolerance
of the cultivation, sale, purchase and possession of marijuana, within the confines of a
strictly regulated but still legalized market." BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 40, at 17.
The authors elaborate:
Wherever the limits of the United States' enforcement discretion
under the drug treaties might be drawn precisely, we know that such
discretion by definition cannot be an across-the-board, categorical
affair, when the issue is federal tolerance of regulated,
comprehensive marijuana markets established by state law. And
that's just it: if more states take a legalize-and-regulate approach, a
federal-level decision not to prosecute similarly situated persons
could start to look like blanket non-enforcement of implementing
legislation-something that, in our view, the drug treaties do not
contemplate.
Id.
183. Boister, supra note 75, at 405-06.
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this outcome is logical and unavoidable when one consideres the extent
and limits of the power of the actors involved. The textualist
perspective, universally accepted by commentators, ignores the
fundamental reality of present limits of US power to change its states'
laws.
From a practical standpoint, when one acknowledges that the
most powerful force at work here has been inertia, the United States'
position ironically begins to look more treaty-friendly. Instead of
assessing the legal merits of the United States' arguments, the better
mode of analysis is to examine the actors at play in this arena and the
power each possesses. The international organ charged with
overseeing treaty compliance is toothless and only has the power to
issue referrals and reports. The Justice Department technically has
the obligation to enforce compliance with international agreements to
which the United States has acceded, but more directly, it is
responsible for enforcing the CSA and answering to the president. The
Justice Department's resources for performing these tasks are limited
by the number of personnel in its employ, and its power is limited by
the level of cooperation it will receive from state analogs. The federal
government has no interest in enforcing every violation of the CSA in
the states, nor does it have any interest in a situation where all state
laws regulating cannabis are removed, thus de facto legalizing the
drug, with only federal agents available to enforce federal law on
multitudinous state users.
As head of the executive branch, the president possesses the power
to direct treaty enforcement, but bears the consequences of domestic
political pressures surrounding cannabis.184 Meanwhile, state
authorities are interested in the tax revenue derived from the sale of
marijuana and in negotiating stable understandings with federal
authorities. There is little incentive on the part of any of these
American actors to put a full stop to the state regulation of cannabis.
The only question of import is which actor has the power to affect
practical change in domestic law; the answer is the power to affect
change on the ground has long resided at the state level. From the
perspective of the treaties, the more important question is where
authority resides to determine whether "mitigating circumstances"
have been met; the answer is that it is largely left to treaty signatories
to interpret and enforce the treaties. As long as cannabis remains
criminalized at the federal level, and as long as the United States'
position goes unchallenged, the status quo will remain in force.185
184. RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 141-43, 155 (2d. ed. 2015).
185. Boister, supra note 75, at 407-09. Boister notes that "The US's taking of this
[flexible approach] exposes a contradiction between the US's post-war rhetorical
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C. Prosecutorial Discretion Empowers the President o Enforce Treaty
Obligations
Many scholars have explored whether under US law, principles of
prosecutorial discretion authorize the president to allow state
legalization experiments to proceed; they have largely concluded that
President Obama was within his rights to set priorities for
enforcement.186 A separate question is whether the president can
ignore or under-enforce a treaty obligation. Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention states, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith."18 7 Good faith in the
context of treaty interpretation may even imply embracing the spirit of
a treaty over the letter.18 8
commitment to supply control and its own practice. It appears to be intent on sticking
with the existing treaties, fostering flexible interpretation to suit changing conditions,.
tolerating different national strategies and countering transnational criminal networks."
Id. at 407-08. Boister notes that this contradictory approach can survive only as long as
the U.S. does not overextend its reach in countering the transnational drug trade.
186. See Bradley E. Markano, Note, Enabling State Deregulation of Marijuana
Through Executive Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 301 (2015) ("The
choice to implement policy through prosecutorial discretion raises a fundamental
question: How much can the executive ignore federal drug law without crossing the line
into unconstitutional legislation by fiat? Fortunately for the President, the Supreme
Court's standard of review for executive action allows him to go quite far."); see also Kate
Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1125 (2013) ("In
the end, given all the structural forces that encourage unilateral executive action, and
given our basic constitutional structure, it is hard to imagine a world without
presidential enforcement."); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive
Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 759 (2014) ("[T]he best achievable balance between prudent
policy and executive duty is likely the sort of unsatisfactory two-step reflected in the
Obama Justice Department's statements: a directive to prosecutors that certain offenses
should be low priority, accompanied by a reminder that federal laws remain in effect,
that Congress is constitutionally responsible for any legal change, and that all
prosecutorial decisions should be made case by case."); Daniel Stepanicich, Comment,
Presidential Inaction and the Constitutional Basis for Executive Nonenforcement
Discretion, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1507, 1546 (2016) ("Executive nonenforcement
discretion is constitutional. If Congress is concerned about executive discretion, then it
should follow the instruction of Chaney and enact legislation rather than continuing the
practice of abdicating power to the executive branch.").
187. Vienna Convention, supra note 145, art. 26.
188. GARDINER, supra note 184. In discussing Article 26, Gardiner states:
Good faith, therefore, means more than simply bona fides in the
sense of absence of mala fides, or rejection of an interpretation
resulting in abuse of rights (though, of course, it includes such
absence and rejection). It signifies an element of reasonableness
qualifying the dogmatism that can result from purely verbal analysis
.... [T]he term is also capable of a sufficiently broad meaning to
include the principle of effective interpretation. Translating the
requirement of good faith into a practical outcome is only easy in the
extreme case. Vattel instances the account of how Tamerlane, having
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"Good Faith" Argument
Criticizing US Strategy
The United States' tolerance-
even tacit endorsement-of
state-level legalization efforts is
a bad faith interpretation of the
treaties' requirements, and the
United States has already
effectively breached by
preventing federal enforcement
authorities from pursuing state
actors. The United States'
"prosecutorial discretion
argument" is nothing more than
a weak reading of a minor
clause in the treaties; its human
rights concerns are





The international drug control
system has always rested on a
fundamental assumption: that
its signatories, cajoled by the
United States, would enforce
prohibitionist measures against
citizens violating domestic drug
use laws. Long critiqued by
scholars and long aggrieved by
internal dissent (as in Alaska
and the Netherlands), the
political consensus around
cannabis prohibitions is
crumbling. The new state of
affairs should contemplate
federalism, signatory discretion,
and human rights concerns as
new priorities in reevaluating
the regime.
The argument on the left serves no practical purpose for both critics
and supporters of the international treaty regime. Given the new
reality in US states-and the limited power of the federal government
to turn the clock back on marijuana reform-the best path forward is
to broaden our interpretive horizons with regards to the US approach
to the treaties. The argument of the right does this well. This is the
only way that the treaties will survive the change in status of their
former chief enforcer of cannabis prohibitions.
A better way to conceptualize the issue of good faith-and a
response to the argument on the left above-is to acknowledge that the
agreed with those in the city of Sebastia that if they capitulated he
would shed no blood, then, when they had fulfilled their part of the
deal, caused all the soldiers of the garrison to be buried alive... Good
faith colours a key part of the general rule of treaty interpretation,
giving the more generous approach to texts of treaties that
characterizes many a decision of international tribunals . . ..
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). This logic means that saving the treaties




legalization of marijuana at the state level in the United States
represents a threat to the international treaty system; that is precisely
why the international community should accept any reasonable
interpretation that the United States has not breached. Indeed, this
makes all the more sense when the proffered explanation rests on the
bedrock elements of the international system itself: human rights and
state sovereignty. The human rights and sovereignty theories, once
linked, help to resolve the dissonance. Good faith in this context may
mean understanding when a flexible interpretation ensures the
treaties' continued survival.1 89
V. CONCLUSION
Fading public support for cannabis prohibition in signatory states
threatens the future of the international drug control regime. The
efforts of US states to change cannabis law have thrown the legal and
political dissonance around drug control into stark relief. The United
States, far from acting the ostrich, is grappling with the limited powers
of its federal government; the prosecutorial discretion approach is a
logical response to that problem and to the limits imposed by Congress
on enforcement. But it cannot persist forever in this dynamic legal
environment. The best path forward is to acknowledge the human
rights implications of past enforcement actions, and fit those
arguments into what limited sovereignty safety valves the treaties
allow. A creative reading of the treaties is, simply, the only path to
allowing them to survive.
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